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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet in the developed countries (and to a lesser extent, also in developing ones)
is a mainstream medium leveraged by private companies for advertising and selling goods
and services, by governments to provide services to the citizens, including information and
news delivery, and by individuals to perform a wide spectrum of activities as: work, es-
tablish and keep social bonds, share information and opinions, participate in communities
of interest and organize and coordinate actions. While the impact of Internet accessibility
on national economies is easily acknowledged [Zwillenberg et al., 2014], its political signif-
icance has recently emerged with political campaigns leveraging the Web and specifically
the Online Social Networks (see Alexandrova [2010] for an analysis of the use of these
media on United States president Barack Obama’s campaign and previous examples).
With the use of the Internet to promote information and political discussion and
activities, the struggle of governments to control this information channel has become
evident: the change over time of Internet Censorship has been analyzed in [Bambauer,
2013], where such worrisome evolution and its last stage (dubbed Censorship v3.1) are the
basis to a call for transparency and public control on censorship application. The author
makes the point that, regardless of the different motivations (legitimate or rhetorical) and
the specific technical means, the intentional limitation of access to information is always
a form of censorship, and as such should be clearly named, highlighting the sensitive and
dangerous nature of its enforcement and requiring strict watch from the citizens.
Although Bambauer [2013] is focused on political and legal aspects more than on tech-
nical details, it gives both an embraceable frame and a strong motivation for censorship
monitoring: an independent, publicly available and global watch on Internet censorship
activities is a fundamental goal to be pursued, specially now that regulators are actively
2pushing it forward.
A chronology of the evolution of Internet Censorship, but with a more technical view-
point, has been previously presented in [Deibert, 2010, chap. 1], in which the authors
leverage the studies carried on in the OpenNet Initiative [ONI] research project to char-
acterize the evolution of the normative and technical control of access to information on
the Internet. Four phases are identified for “Cyberspace Regulation”, summarized as
• Open Commons (1990s-2000) - Internet is considered as an information sharing
media it is named “cyberspace”, a world somehow separated and different from
“real life”, not subjected to the same rules. Unbounded, cheap-as-free access to all
available online information is the norm. Governments mostly ignore the Internet
or lightly regulate it.
• Access Denied (2000-2005) - States and other entities start considering online ac-
tivities as demanding management: filtering activities are enacted at country or
organization level, often to block specific content categories (pornography, content
deemed harmful to underages); the freedom of access to information is actively chal-
lenged.
• Access Controlled (2005-2010) - Regulatory approaches are emphasized, a wider
range of means and points of control (non necessarily technical in nature) are ex-
ploited by authorities to shape and control the access to information. Active meth-
ods such as computer network attacks, espionage and public opinion forming (ad-hoc
creation of content by fake “common citizen” or grassroots movements) are enacted.
Surveillance and the implied self-censorship are linked with national conditions and
regulations, as the obligation of registering with an identification document when
accessing the Internet. From the technical point of view, ad-hoc filtering is the
new challenge for censorship assessment: time limited blocking of specific online
resources is hard to detect or can be mistaken by a failure, or an attack whose
instigator is hard to provably traceback.
• Access Contested (2010-current) - The fight and the debate about regulation of
access to online information has come in the foreground, with governments pushing
their prerogative of controlling online information and companies providing filtering
services and technologies on one side, and individuals, organizations and private
companies arguing these prerogatives in order to defend their rights and interests,
on the other side.
3Besides the aforementioned ones, other definitions of Internet Censorship can be found
in academic literature and in technical reports and news, often implicit in the description,
or in the detection and analysis techniques adopted for its study. Even if censorship
can also be enforced by limiting the use of other Internet applications, such as Voice-
Over-IP, Virtual Private Networks, Tor, most literature and news refer to web content,
i.e. information accessible through web browsers and employing the HTTP and HTTPS
protocols. The targets of this type of censorship, i.e.whole websites or specific resources
that are made unreachable to the user, have been described by [ONI] as belonging to the
following categories:
• Political: the focus is on websites that express views opposing governments. In most
cases the content is related to human rights, freedom of expression, minority rights
and religious movements.
• Social: the focus is on content related to sexuality, gambling, illegal drugs and
alcohol and any other issue considered illicit.
• Conflict/security: focuses on content related to armed conflicts, border disputes,
and militant groups.
• Internet tools: websites that provide email, Internet hosting, search, translation,
voice-over Internet Protocol, and telephone service, as well as circumvention meth-
ods.
This classification has been referenced in subsequent works on Internet Censorship detec-
tion [Bitso et al., 2012, Filasto` and Appelbaum, 2012].
A few research efforts, NGOs and associations such as Reporters Without Borders [RWB],
the OpenNet Initiative [ONI], Human Right Watch [HRW], provide reports on the state of
Internet Censorship in different countries, often including information collected by local
contacts on the network infrastructure and experimental data.
While providing an invaluable (and possible risky) service by giving insight in the
objectives of censorship and the adopted techniques, the original information is collected,
analyzed and released on varying timescales or in spot efforts, and the exposed results -
often only in aggregated form - are not suitable for independent analysis and validation.
Collecting the base data in order to asses the near-real-time evolution of censorship
is made difficult by the different possible censorship techniques, by the number of online
resources and services that are potentially subject to blocking, and by the global scale of
4phenomenon. Moreover, there are strong ethical issues in involving in measurements the
volunteers in countries not under the rule of law [RWB], as it makes impossible to define
the legitimacy of the measurement activities and thus possibly exposes the volunteer
to legal or personal risks. A process of informed consent for volunteers’ participation,
assistance from field activists and the exclusion from the research of the most dangerous
countries has been the approach chosen by researchers in this field1.
Crowd-sourced platforms, such as Herdict her, appear as the most viable approach
to cover these needs. To this aim a limited number of tools and platforms have been
proposed, but from the analysis of the state of the art the lack of a sustainable censorship
monitoring platform has arisen. More specifically we have noticed the lack of a publicly
available tool performing censorship detection that is: (i) user friendly, with minimal need
for user intervention; (ii) directly useful to the user, fostering the adoption of the tool; (iii)
integrated in a monitoring platform, to leverage multi-viewpoint and large time-scale
analysis.
In turn, the monitoring platform backing the tool has to provide: (i) automatically
updated censorship tests; (ii) automatically updated censorship targets to be verified; (iii)
reports of detected censorship tailored for the user’s environment (iv) support for different
types of probing clients.
Available tools and platforms present only a limited subset of these properties, thus
the candidate has proposed a design comprising all of them, also adding a novel feature,
namely the scheduling of evidence collection activities, that was missing from
the available literature to the best of the candidate’s knowledge. A prototype of the
proposed design has been implemented and experimentally validated, also including novel
censorship detection algorithms based on the collected data.
This Thesis work is structured as follows.
In Chapter 2 an analysis of Internet Censorship techniques is provided based on liter-
ature. Documented techniques are characterized and systematically classified with refer-
ence to the communication phases they affect and disrupt, the definition of the protocols
fields that elicit the reaction of the censoring system and the effect experienced by the
user.
In Chapter 3 the detection and monitoring of Internet Censorship is presented, with
an analysis of the state of the art listing the main censorship monitoring platforms and
1source: debate in the workshop on Monitoring Internet Openness and Rights [Aceto et al., 2013]
5tools with their limitations and shortcomings.
The UBICA platform is then presented in Chapter 4 as the candidate proposal for a
Censorship Monitoring platform addressing some of the shortcomings highlighted in the
previous chapter.
The experimental validation of the proposed platform implementation is reported in
Chapter 5 with the analysis of the results of the activity of the platform over different
measurement campaigns.
Chapter 6 concludes the work, summarizing the thesis and its experimental validation,
and proposing future research.
Chapter 2
Internet Censorship
Internet Censorship is a phenomenon that crosses several study fields, from computer
networking and computer security to social sciences; several definitions can be found in
academic literature and in technical reports and news, but often they are implicit and
described by means of specific detection or analysis technique. Most literature refers to
censorship of web content, i.e. information accessible through web browsers (adopting an
application level view) and employing the HTTP and HTTPS protocols. We note that
web browsing (and more generally applications adopting HTTP or HTTPS protocols) is
only one kind of network application that use the Internet, other examples being Voice-
Over-IP, Peer-to-peer file sharing, e-mail, multi-user video games, Instant Messaging;
censorship has been found to be enforced also on some of these applications.
2.1 Overview
From a network topology point of view, a coarse-grain classification can be proposed
with regards to the components of the communication system that are employed for
censorship: client-based, and server-based, if censorship is applied at the ends of the
communication path, network-based, if it happens in between. While this Thesis work
is focused on network-based censorship detection, in the following an overview of client-
based and server-based censorship techniques is given both for completeness and to clarify
the scope of the work.
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2.1.1 Client-based Censorship
We consider client-based censorship as the blocking of access to online content by means
of applications running on the same system of the network application client. It can be
implemented by different means, such as: an independent application, akin to a keylogger 1,
that terminates the applications whose keyboard input matches a blacklisted keyword -
such apparently is the technology employed in Cuba, [Voeux and Pain, 2006, anecdotal
report from journalists]. Another form for this kind of censorship is a network filter
like parental control or company policy control enforcement filters, running as a personal
firewall. Finally, it can be enforced as a modified version of the network application client
itself, added with surveillance “features”, as the case of TOM-Skype in China [Villeneuve].
2.1.2 Server-based Censorship
The final node of the communication path, the server, is the component where server-
based censorship is enforced, with no disruption of the communication mechanics: the
censor selectively removes, hides, or impairs access to specific content directly in the
server, by means of management facilities provided by the service itself. The censoring
action can be enforced commanding the server manager to comply with the request.
This form of censorship is specifically hard to be analyzed, as its mechanics are internal
to the service and not exposed to the users; a recent quantitative analysis of it has been
performed in [Zhu et al., 2013], that reported several censoring evidences of different type
(divided as proactive or retroactive mechanisms), and proposed hypotheses on how these
mechanisms are actually enacted.
The existence of this kind of censorship is sometimes acknowledged by the Online
Service Providers themselves. One such case is Google Transparency Report - Removal
Requests2 by which Google discloses a summary of requests from governments or from
copyright owners to block access to specific content. While the actual removed targets
are not disclosed, a categorization of removal requests is done according to the reason and
the type of requester and the related statistics are provided. This kind of censorship and
its consequences are analyzed under the term “intermediary censorship” in Deibert [2010,
chap. 5].
1an application that covertly intercepts and processes key strokes directed to other applications running
on the same system
2http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government
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2.1.3 Network-based Censorship
In between the host running the application client and the host running the respective
server part is where network-based censorship is enforced.
With respect to client-based censorship it provides the censor a much wider coverage
of the network and with more efficiency, allowing the control of high number of commu-
nications through the management of a relatively few gateways or hubs (instead of one
installation for each user system). On the other hand, client-based censorship implies the
control of the user terminal or the compliance of the user herself, for each controlled user.
Similar considerations can be done with respect to server-based censorship, that in
turn requires control or compliance of server host managers. The relatively small number
of popular services helps the censor that wants to control them, but there is the possibility
that such servers are located abroad or otherwise outside of the influence of the censor,
thus nor direct control nor compliance can be forced.
These comparisons highlight the pivotal importance of network-based censorship, that
constitutes the central phenomenon considered in the present Thesis work, and will be
analyzed in more detail in the following section. Unless explicitly stated differently, here-
after by “censorship” will be intended “network-based Internet censorship”, and similarly
by “detection” will be intended “detection of network-based Internet censorship”.
2.2 Definitions
Terminology in the matter of Internet Censorship is not well defined, being often ambigu-
ous and inconsistent across different papers. The phenomenon under analysis also lacks a
common definition, being named filtering, blocking, interference, tampering, surveillance,
referring possibly to different aspects of it, with little or no formalisms. This does not
help scientific discussion on the topic and the sharing of technical advancement in detec-
tion and circumvention. Valuable contributions in the direction of clearly defining the
concepts related with Internet Censorship have been provided by Verkamp and Gupta
[2012] and Filasto` and Appelbaum [2012], even though they were not driven by this goal,
their approaches aiming either at reporting the state of art or providing the researchers
with detection tools. One of the first technical characterization of Internet Censorship
can be found in [Dornseif, 2003], that defines it as “ [. . . ] refusing users access to cer-
tain web pages without the cooperation of the content provider, the hosting provide and the
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owner of the client machine being used to access these pages.”. A somehow more generic
definition is proposed in [Elahi and Goldberg, 2012]: “Internet censorship is the inten-
tional suppression of information originating, flowing or stored on systems connected to
the Internet where that information is relevant for decision making to some entity.”. This
definition, while having merits in highlighting the motivation behind the censorship and
its intentionality, goes beyond the scope of the present Thesis work, that is focused on
the detection of censorship and has little practical use for the modeling of the censor’s
decision making processes.
Therefore, extending the definition provided in [Dornseif, 2003] for web pages also to
general Internet applications and to what we will describe as soft censorship techniques,
we define “internet censorship” the intentional impairing of a client application in reaching
a requested resource or service, enforced by a third party (neither the user, nor the server
operator), named hereafter “censor”. The intentionality differentiates censorship from
outages and the selective censor behavior (affecting the censored resources or services and
not others) is the condition necessary to detect it. We note that the adoption of a client-
server terminology does not restrict the definition to applications implementing exclusively
this communication paradigm, as also in peer-to-peer applications each communication
sees at least one node initiating the exchange thus qualifying itself as “client” for that
exchange.
In the following we define terms and concepts related to Internet censorship that will be
useful in describing censoring techniques and censorship detection techniques, elaborating
on definitions (explicit or implicit) from the related literature.
target an online resource or service; it is characterized by information needed by a client
application to access it: e.g. for a document its URL, or for a service its application
protocol (described by means of signatures potentially triggering kewword-based
censorship) or a list of servers (characterized by hostname, IP addresses, transport
port).
trigger the element or group of elements, in the client request to access the target,
that cause the censoring system to act; if the trigger is absent (where possible) or
substituted with a non-trigger then censorship does not happen i.e. the requested
target is reachable; it is characterized by the phase of communication it affects, the
levels of the network protocol stack that are involved and possibly specific protocols;
implies the presence of a surveillance device.
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surveillance device the device that analyzes the user traffic looking for triggers ; it is
characterized by the phase of communication it affects, the (topological) position in
the network path, the levels of the network protocol stack that are inspected;
action the action performed by the censor to block, mangle or impair the access to the
target; it is characterized, like the trigger, by the phase of communication it affects
and the levels of the network protocol stack that are involved; implies the presence
of a censoring device performing it.
censoring device a device that applies the censoring action by tampering with the
communication between the user and the target so that it is impaired or altogether
prevented; the surveillance and censoring devices can be co-located and coincide;
censoring system the surveillance and censoring devices;
symptom what the user experiences as result of the censor action; it can range from the
access to a modified target, to an annoying worsening of quality of experience, to
complete unreachability of the target possibly accompanied with an error; in case
an error is provided, it characterizes the symptom with the phase of communication
and the level of the network stack that appears to issue the error.
circumvention the process of nullifying the censoring action, i.e. accessing the unmodi-
fied target despite the presence of a censoring system; this can be done by preventing
the trigger from being seen by the surveillance device or by countering the effects
of the action.
2.2.1 Communication Phases
The action performed by the censor will involve (either interfering directly with-, or
showing the effects on-) some specific phases of communication. In the following a basic
knowledge of the TCP/IP suite of protocols and related terminology is assumed3.
In order to easily refer to these phases we adopt a simplified model of a communication:
the message exchange a web browser would establish to access a resource my means of
the HTTPS protocol [Dierks and Rescorla, 2008]; the chain of events is shown in Figure 2.1
in an abstract form and as it would happen if not altered by the censor. For the purpose
of the following description and analysis of the phenomenon, the considered application-
level protocol (HTTP) can be substituted with a generic client-server application-level
3for a comprehensive coverage of the related definitions and concepts we refer to [Ross and Kurose,
1999]
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protocol.
Figure 2.1: Generic HTTPS sequence diagram
In the considered scenario the request of the user (event (1)) starts the chain of events
described hereafter.
The browser issues a DNS4query to the default recursive resolver asking for the IP
address corresponding to the given URL (event (2));
The DNS server (more precisely, “recursive resolver”) will search for the requested
information in the DNS database by querying other Name Servers (not shown), finally
obtaining the answer, that will be sent back to the client (event (3)). Censorship tech-
niques acting on this phase of communication are described in Section 2.3.2.
Knowing the IP address of the desired target server, the browser sets up a reliable com-
munication with it: the TCP protocol performs a three-way handshake (event (4)). Cen-
sorship techniques acting on this phase of communication are described in Section 2.3.4.
4Domain Name System, the hierarchical distributed database that translates between resources and
their Internet addresses [Mockapetris, 1987a,b].
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In order to authenticate the server (thus verifying that the other end of the communi-
cation is really the intended target server) and to prevent third parties from reading the
content of the communication, a TLS session is established (event (5)). Censorship tech-
niques acting on this phase of communication are described in Section 2.3.8. When the
URL requested by the user requires the HTTP protocol instead of HTTP this phase is
skipped.
Once the reliable, authenticated and private channel is established, the browser issues
an HTTP GET query to the target server (event (6)). This request is subject to censorship
of the kind described in Section 2.3.5, and in principle also to techniques in Section 2.3.4,
as it is encapsulated in TCP packets.
The target server processes the requests (event 7), finding or dynamically generating
the resource corresponding to the URL. This is the point where server-based censorship
is enforced. Besides the overview in Section 2.1.2 we will not cover this phase in more
detail.
The response containing the requested resource is then sent back to the browser (event
8), possibly implying several TCP packets according to the size of the returned resource.
This event is in principle subject to the same censorship techniques of event 6.
The browser evaluates the response first evaluating the HTTP level protocol informa-
tion (9.1), and accordingly parses the (optional) body of the response (9.2),(9.3), then it
is possibly induced to request other resources.
Events 6 to 8 are repeated for each request of resources from the browser to the same
target, until the session is closed; for resources requested to other target new communica-
tions are established, restarting from message (2).
2.3 Censorship techniques
The techniques employed by the censors can be characterized in terms of the trigger
that initiates the censoring process (and thus implicitly the phase of communication in
which the trigger is sent), the action itself, and the symptom experienced by the user. A
general distinction is between stateless and stateful censoring technique or system: in the
first kind the censoring action is performed deciding on a per-packet basis (presence of
the trigger); in the latter the decision depends on both the information on past packets
(status) and the presence of the related trigger : what constitutes a trigger changes over
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time according to the sequence of packets that are seen by the surveillance device.
The overall censoring system can operate in a single step, or may be designed as
multi-stage, involving a cascade of two or more devices processing the inspected traffic.
A characterization of censorship techniques along these properties is presented in the
following and summarized graphically in Figure 2.4, where the defining properties of
one of the techniques are highlighted (two-stage DNS hijacking and HTTP injection,
Section 2.3.10).
In the following the techniques are described, grouped according to the type of action
(and the possible setups) adopted by the censor, also discussing the remaining elements.
2.3.1 BGP tampering
Packet forwarding - the basic functionality of packet-switched networks - is performed
according to criteria set by a routing algorithm. In the Internet the routing algorithm that
is used by routers to coordinate across different administrative boundaries (Autonomous
Systems, ”AS”) is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Rekhter et al. [2006]. Interfering
with the intended functionality of the BGP protocol has potential impact to whole sub-
networks up to the scale of whole countries. Such has been the case documented during
the so-called “Arab Spring”, the events of social unrest manifestation and civil protests
occurred during the first part of 2011 in Libya and Egypt [Dainotti et al., 2011], where
these countries were made unreachable from outside the country ASes by withdrawing
their presence from the BGP network view. When these techniques escape the control of
the censor, dramatic side effects can verify, as happened in the 2009 incident that made
YouTube unreachable also from outside the controlled network of Pakistan or a similar
event caused by China in 2010 [Mueller, 2012, chap. 9]. The mechanics of such accidental
misuse of BGP - that can also be intentional tampering [Feng and Guo, 2012] - have been
studied by Ballani et al. [2007], that have estimated that a significant part of the Internet
was potentially subject to prefix hijacking : the condition in which packets that an AS
Y should forward to an AS C1 are erroneously diverted to another AS X because X
advertised to Y a fake shorter path towards C1 (see Figure 2.2).
In the characterization of censorship that we have adopted, this technique presents as
trigger the destination or source IP addresses; in fact by diverting to a black hole one
direction of traffic consequently makes bidirectional exchange impossible: TCP connection
are surely affected and only one-way traffic (notably related with malicious activities
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Figure 2.2: BGP tampering - prefix hijacking: traffic from AS C3 to AS C1 is erroneously diverted to
AS X. (from Ballani et al. [2007, fig. 2])
- scans, backscatter [Dainotti et al., 2011]) is allowed through. The symptom an user
would experience is a network unreachable error in case of prefix withdrawal, and time
exceeded TTL expiration in case of prefix hijacking that leads to loops or too longer
paths.
2.3.2 DNS tampering
The access to a target usually implies the translation from the symbolic name of the
server hosting the resource to its IP address (see exchanges 2 and 3 in Figure 2.1). The
communications related with this phase can be subject to different censorship techniques,
first analyzed in detail in [Dornseif, 2003]. The sequence diagram of a DNS request is
shown in Figure 2.3: the software module on the client (referred to as “stub resolver”)
issues a type A query to the recursive resolver 5, that is in charge of performing the
resolution asking the authoritative servers (or providing a previously cached response).
We have adopted the umbrella term “DNS tampering” to avoid confusion with the
term “DNS redirection” found in literature [Gill et al., 2013] to specify one of the possible
effects (thus a symptom in the lexicon defined in this Thesis) of these censoring techniques,
while there are different variants involved with this process, according to (i) the presence
5The recursive resolver IP address is provided by the network administrator or obtained by automatic
host configuration, and usually corresponds to a server of the Internet Service Provider that gives the
client host connectivity to the Internet.
Censorship techniques 15
of surveillance devices on the path between the client (stub resolver) and the recursive
resolver and (ii) the kind of response that is provided back. These variants are described
in the following.
DNS hijacking
According to the protocol definition [Mockapetris, 1987b], when a DNS recursive server
is queried for a resource record it should fetch it from the authoritative servers (if a
cached entry is not found): censoring servers instead reply with a forged response, not
corresponding to the legitimate DNS database entry. Having administrative control on
the DNS server allows to alter its behavior diverting it from the standard; the following
possible responses are given:
NXDOMAIN : an error response of type “no such domain” - the domain name refer-
enced in the query does not exist [Mockapetris, 1987a]
forged Resource Record : a Resource Record of type A, Class IN with an IP falling
in one of the following cases:
• surveillance IP : the returned IP address is assigned to a surveillance device
that inspects higher layer protocols;
• Block Page: the returned IP address hosts a webserver that invariably serves
a page telling that the requested hostname has been deliberately blocked.
• Failing IP : a non-Internet-routable addresses such as private address space
[Rekhter et al., 1996] or shared address space [Weil et al., 2012] as well as or-
dinary assigned IP addresses unrelated with the requested resource;
• Error Page: the returned IP address hosts a webserver that invariably serves
a page telling that the requested hostname is not existent or misspelled ;
The symptom that the client experiences is therefore different according to the replies it
gets: only in the “Block Page” case the censorship is clearly notified, possibly providing a
motivation or a law demanding it, and in some cases a reference to appeal the censorship.
If a DNS error is returned, a tech-savvy user can infer that something went wrong
with the name resolution phase (which is indeed true).
The same happens for the “Error Page” case: against the definitions of the related
protocols, the error is surfaced to the application level but still gives hints about the phase
that failed.
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When a “Failing IP” is provided, an error of type network unreachable or host
unreachable, or a TCP connection error will be returned to the user, giving no infor-
mation about the real event. In case the returned IP address is assigned to a host, the
symptom will be different according to whether a service is listening at the transport port
(usually 80, for HTTP requests) and how it will react to the HTTP request (a HTTP 404
resource not found error).
This is but one example of how little transparency an user would experience when
dealing with censored resources, and how simple detection tests (such as the one per-
formed through the [Herdict] platform 3.3.1) can not give reliable information about the
censorship technique.
DNS tampering is also used in two-stages censoring techniques, in order to divert
selected traffic to a surveillance device that will inspect and possibly cause censorship
(see Section 2.3.10).
This censorship technique has been documented since the early analysis of internet
censorship [Dornseif, 2003] and confirmed in most of the field tests worldwide [ONI]; we
too have found such results in the experimental validation (e.g. Section 5.2.1).
The trigger for this censorship technique is a UDP port 53 packet directed to the IP
address of the misbehaving DNS recursive resolver and containing a DNS query of type A
including the hostname belonging to the blacklist. In order to enforce censorship with this
technique it is not necessary to have a surveillance device on the network path between
the client and the target, as the client will issue a direct request to the recursive resolver
(that acts as the censoring device). This on the other hand makes the circumvention
of this censorship technique straightforward: changing the default recursive resolver will
avoid the censoring device and thus leave open access to the Internet. Actually the change
of the default (ISP-provided) DNS recursive resolver with other “open” resolvers is not
rare, but can adversely impact the user experience [Ager et al., 2010].
DNS injection
Differently from DNS hijacking - performed directly at the recursive resolver - a more so-
phisticated technique is the injection of forged packets that imitate the legitimate response
of the queried DNS server but providing fake data. Injection can happen at different lo-
cations of the network, not necessarily on the path between the client and the target and
requires a surveillance device on the network path between the stub resolver and the re-
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cursive resolver or between the latter and the authoritative server that should provide the
requested Resource Record.
Looking at Figure 2.3 it can be noted how a censoring device has the opportunity of
replying to the stub server faster than the queried resolver: the first well formed message
arriving to the client will be accepted, and a possible subsequent legitimate one will be
ignored.
Figure 2.3: DNS tampering - injection. (Modified from Dagon et al. [2008, fig. 2] with the addition of
the highlighted time window on the bottom: the interval allowing injection between the stub resolver
and the recursive resolver.)
The trigger for this technique is similar to the hijacking performed at the ISP recur-
sive resolver (UDP packet with destination port 53, carrying a DNS query of type A with
the blacklisted hostname) but in this case there is no need to have the default DNS recur-
sive resolver for the IP destination address: as long as the packet reaches the surveillance
device the censorship will be applied. This makes ineffective the simple circumvention
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technique adopted against the DNS hijacking described before, as also the queries ad-
dressed to third party resolvers will be intercepted and replied with the tampered data.
The types of responses that are injected are the same as the aforementioned ones,
and thus the same symptoms are experienced by the client. Due to the different mechan-
ics, however, this technique can have much broader impact than intended, as found in
[anonymous, 2012], where it is shown how censorship applied by transit ASes affects also
DNS queries originating from foreign countries, finally censoring the target for peoples
that are not subject to the censor’s jurisdiction.
DNS-Sec DoS
The original design of DNS did not assume an hostile network environment, hence the
weakness of this protocol in the face of tampering; to extend it while retaining compati-
bility with the existing infrastructure the Secure DNS (DNS-Sec) specification has been
proposed [Atkins and Austein, 2004].
The adoption of DNS-Sec provides secure authentication of server response, thus pre-
venting the possibility of injecting a forged response that could be accepted as valid.
From an accessibility point of view, this ultimately prevents the access to the target, con-
stituting a form of Denial of Service and succeeding in the censoring intent. Moreover,
redirection to fake or warning content would be impossible and so would be “informed
blocking”: the only symptom a client would experience is a DNS-Sec error reporting that
the name resolution system has been tampered with. In this case the expert user could
be aware of the man-in-the-middle attack she is undergoing, but an user ignoring the
network technicalities could as well blame the target for the failure.
Other possibilities for the censor to work-around DNS-Sec are also considered in [Vixie,
2012], but they are all discarded concluding that current DNS tampering techniques are
not compatible with DNS-Sec adoption. Though current deployment of DNS-Sec may be
limited [Lian et al., 2013], it is expected to grow as security concerns mandate it, thus
enlarging the negative impact on transparency of DNS level censorship.
2.3.3 Packet filtering
We group under the term “packet filtering” all the censorship techniques whose action is
to simply discard packets. With this technique the triggering packet is silently dropped
causing a symptom of type connection timed out error. The trigger is data from the
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headers of up to the fourth level of the TCP/IP network stack (thus including also network
layer). The motivation for associating triggers of different layers to a single censoring
technique (while in principle they should be used to tell apart different setups) is that the
enforcement of censorship based on the headers of these two protocols have little practical
differences: packet filtering of varying complexity is a standard functionality provided by
network devices ranging from switches to dedicated security appliances.
This technique requires a surveillance device on the path between the client and the
target (as opposed to BGP tampering and DNS hijacking), and the censoring device
must be in-line too (as noted, they are possibly the same device). In a stateless censoring
system this technique can be used to block IP addresses of targets that are also subject
to DNS tampering, so that if the client circumvents censorship in the DNS resolution
phase (Figure 2.1, message exchanges up to “(3)”) it is caught on the first packet of the
TCP handshake (Figure 2.1, message exchanges “(4)”) . It has been found in the wild
[Dornseif, 2003, Murdoch and Anderson, 2008], but on the one side it has the shortcoming
of blocking all services reachable at the same IP address (thus “overblocking” virtual hosts
that, though having a different hostname, are hosted on the same IP), on the other side
it requires the censor to collect all the IP addresses associated with the targeted resource
and configure the surveillance device with rules for all of them. The same setup and
trigger can be used to selectively route packets towards an off-path surveillance device in
multi-stage censoring systems (see Section 2.3.10).
2.3.4 TCP connection disruption
The disruption of the communication during either the setup of the TCP connection
(Figure 2.1, phase (4)) or during the subsequent packet exchange belonging to the same
connection, i.e. sharing the same 5-tuple (source IP, destination IP, protocol=TCP, source
port, destination port) .
Techniques enforcing this action leverage the connection-oriented nature of the TCP
protocol: a notion of “state” of the connection is held at each endpoint and signals are
used to set-up and tear-down the connection. The censoring device sends to the client
packets that have the source IP of the target and the RST flag set, indicating that the
connection is in a wrong state and thus has to be immediately terminated. The client
will experience a symptom of type connection reset error.
The trigger for this technique contains the destination IP address or of the target
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[Clayton et al., 2006] and possibly the transport level port numbers, to limit censoring to
a specific application such as HTTP (port 80), HTTPS (port 443), SSH (port 22); this
requires a surveillance device on the path between the client and the target (as opposed
to BGP tampering and DNS hijacking).
This action can be used as in two-stage techniques (see Section 2.3.10).
2.3.5 Keyword blocking
A surveillance device that analyzes packets beyond the headers of IP and TCP is said to be
performing Deep Packet Inspection. Different depths of inspection are possible depending
on the payload that is analyzed (first packet, a given number of initial packets, all the
packets); moreover different degrees of complexity in the analysis of such payload can be
adopted (per-packet string matching, per-stream string matching, syntactical verification,
semantic verification), progressing from a stateless to stateful inspection with increasing
status information kept per connection. The more payload is analyzed and the more
complex the analysis, the higher the resources required for the surveillance device6.
The action performed by the censoring system can be of the same kind of the ones
adopted in TCP-level filtering, but having an established TCP connection between the
client and the target there is also the chance to provide application data, e.g. to redirect
to a blocking page, or performing varying degrees of content mangling.
An example of enforcement of such kind of action for applications using HTTP is
HTTP tampering, described in the following.
2.3.6 HTTP tampering
If a TCP connection is allowed to complete successfully (reaching the phase (6) in Fig-
ure 2.1, the censor has the opportunity of providing the client with an HTTP message
that will be parsed by the client as it were coming from the queried target.
The HTTP protocol7 messages are divided in two parts: the header and (not for all
types of message) a body; a fundamental part of the header for response messages8is the
status code, a numeric value of three digits characterizing the message type. According
6see [Risso et al., 2008] for a comparison of accuracy and resource consumption of different traffic
classification methods
7[Fielding et al., 1999]
8“response messages” are sent by the server when replying to “request messages”, from the client.
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to the different triggers that the surveillance device looks for in the request message,
the different response messages that the censoring device sends back to the client, and
the location of these components of the censoring system, the variants described in the
following are possible.
The action of the censoring device in the case of HTTP tampering consists in sending
an HTTP response message belonging to the following types, with some status codes
grouped by the first two digits:
• code 30X redirect, signaling that the requested resource is at another URL, reported
in the “location” header field; this will cause the web browser to begin a new com-
munication sequence (starting from phase (2) in Figure 2.1 to the given address;
this constitutes an “HTTP redirect” and the experienced symptom for the user will
depend on the result of the new communication;
• code 404 resource not found: the path of the requested URL does not correspond
to a resource known to the server; the symptom experienced by the user will be a
browser-provided error message describing the error;
• code 403 forbidden: the request is valid but the resource will not be provided;
the body of the message can contain a description of the reason; the symptom
experienced by the user will be the content of the page if present, or a browser-
provided error message describing the error
• code 200 no error, signaling that the requested resource is provided in the body of
the message; the browser will parse the content.
2.3.7 HTTP proxy filtering
A special case of semantic stateful inspection is constituted by a transparent proxy located
in-line with respect to the path between the client and the target, by all means performing
a MITM, forwarding only content that does not match the blacklisting rules. The proxy
fully understands the application level protocol, hence the keyword matching can be done
on specific statuses of the application protocol automaton, and on specific data fields, thus
being highly selective and reducing possibilities of overblocking. The downside is that the
transparent proxy must be in-line and that it is required significant processing power,
otherwise performance impairing or altogether blocking could occur as a byproduct also
for traffic that should not be censored.
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An alternative is to have multi-stage censorship system, with the preceding stages in
charge of pre-filtering (and blocking) connections or “hijacking” towards the censoring
device the suspicious connections only (see Section 2.3.10).
2.3.8 TLS tampering
One widely adopted defense against various kinds of Man-In-The-Middle(MITM) attacks
in accessing content on the Internet is provided by Transport Layer Security / Secure
Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL)[Dierks and Rescorla, 2008]. This protocol operates over the
transport layer of the TCP/IP stack and offers an authenticated and private channel
to the application protocol (thus behaving as a lower sub-layer of the application layer).
Besides HTTP, that we are considering in the simplified communication model represented
in Figure 2.1, it can be adopted to secure other application layer protocols such as FTP,
SMTP, XMPP, based on TCP9.
Basically TLS performs a session setup phase using asymmetric cyphers whose keys
(in form of SSL “certificates”) are verified by means of a trusted third party, the “Certi-
fication Authority” (CA). Once the negotiation of a symmetric cypher and session key is
completed, the remaining communication will convey the encrypted data of the applica-
tion level protocol.
TLS compelled certification creation attack
Although a number of weaknesses and countermeasures have been proposed in the past, a
recent “politically sensitive” attack scenario has been presented in [Soghoian and Stamm,
2012] that could be easily employed by a censor in order to tamper with the communication
(e.g. editing content) in ways unnoticeable to the user. The effectiveness of the attack
is based on providing an SSL certificate for the site attesting a false identification, but
still results as valid because it is signed by a trusted (but actually misbehaving) CA. In
the attack scenario introduced in [Soghoian and Stamm, 2012] this CA can be compelled
by government institutions to provide a site-specific certificate or even an intermediate
certificate that can be used to generate valid ones for any website (hence the name of
compelled certification creation attack).
9for applications relying on the UDP transport protocol there is a dedicated version, Datagram Trans-
port Layer Security [Rescorla and Modadugu, 2006]
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While injecting an invalid certificate would warn the user that some kind of issue
is happening (still not declaring that it is intentional censorship), the use of a rogue
certificate would completely hide the tampering and still provide the user with both
tampered content and a false sense of confidence in its authenticity.
The trigger of this technique is an HTTPS request with an hostname for which the
compelled CA has generated a rogue (fake but valid) certificate. The symptom is the
reception of mangled content without the TLS protocol being able to alert for it.
To the best of the candidate’s knowledge, there is no documentation about the use of
MITM attacks by means of compelled certification creation aimed at censoring content,
but only at accessing encrypted communications (e.g. in the Iranian GMail incident
[Leyden, 2011]); nonetheless there is no theoretical obstacle to adoption for censorship in
addition to the known surveillance application.
TLS failure
Analogous to the DNS-Sec case, if the censor tries to intercept the beginning of the
communication that is protected with TLS and fails to provide a valid certificate then the
TLS layer will warn the application that the validation of the certificate has failed and
thus a MITM attack could have been attempted.
The trigger of this technique is an HTTPS request with an hostname for which the
censor does not provide a valid certificate, and the symptom is an error (usually presented
with an evident pop-up offering the user to either abort the connection or to override
the failed certificate check and continue). If the user refuses to continue will not have
access to the target. Again, an informed user is able to understand what happened, while
an ordinary user could blame the target itself or the browser security features. If the
user decides to ignore the validation error then the censor has access to the cleartext
communication and thus can apply the surveillance and censoring techniques described
before (again preventing the user from accessing the unmodified target).
2.3.9 Soft Censorship
Blocking the access to an online resource or service is an evident action, that if prolonged
in time stands out as intentional, and possibly drawing attention and strong complains.
Instead, gradually reducing the Quality of Service (QoS)10 and thus the perceived per-
10[Kurose, 1993].
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formances is much less evident, and it’s harder to prove intentionality. Inconstancy of
performance also adds up to the difficulties in measuring this action, and also on the frus-
tration of the user, that ultimately will look for -allowed- alternatives: such is allegedly
the case for the Chinese offer of online services replicating foreign analogous [J., 2011].
The intended effect thus, i.e. preventing the user from accessing some resource or service,
is reached anyway.
In order to enforce this kind of soft censorship, also called throttling [Anderson, 2013],
tools initially devised to guarantee QoS - and later used to violate network neutrality for
economical advantage - are being employed [Aryan et al., 2013].
The action corresponds to the worsening of QoS parameters:
• increased packet loss
• increased delays
• increased jitter
• reduced bandwidth
One simple method to achieve these results would be to filter random packets along
the path. In the case of TCP connections this would significantly impact the delays and
throughput due to the connection-oriented nature of the protocol, bound to retransmitting
lost packets and waiting for in-order reassembly. UDP instead would not suffer additional
damage besides the packet loss, but the communication is still heavily affected in case the
application protocol that is carried in UDP has its own loss recovery mechanisms.
Such actions can be implemented in routers and thus classified as a special case of
“TCP/IP” filtering, and can adopt both a stateless or a stateful paradigm.
As for the other cases analyzed so far, a preferential location for the censoring device
would be on national border connection gateways.
The trigger can be, like ordinary (blocking) censorship, related to specific targets, but a
notable difference is that in this case the trigger can also be void, i.e. all communications,
no matter the target or protocol, or content - will be subject to the action. This scenario is
possibly based on external events (not elicited from the network) that cause a curfew-like
control of Internet access [Aryan et al., 2013] reminding of the nation-wide disconnects
experienced in the events of the “Arab Spring”Dainotti et al. [2011].
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2.3.10 Multi-stage blocking
Having a surveillance / censoring device working in-line requires that it has to be deployed
at country borders in order to intercept traffic directed to foreign countries (hosting
targets that are legally out of direct reach for the censor). This setup poses two technical
problems: (i) it has to process all the cross-border exchange traffic, potentially suffering
performance issues; (ii) it constitutes a Single Point of Failure: any issue in this equipment
would disconnect the served network from the Internet, with potentially high economic
loss.
This problem has been solved in known censorship systems by employing multi-stage
systems, e.g. preselecting at the first stage a much smaller fraction of “suspicious” traffic,
discharging the second-stage device from processing large part of permitted traffic. This
way the finer-grain blocking of the second-stage censoring device does not come at a high
cost.
Another solution uses a deployment where the first stage is akin to a mirroring port
just copying the traffic to an out-of-band inspection device, that thus does not impair the
transmission performance of the original flows. Such a setup has a drawback, though:
the enforcement of injection techniques is more challenging for the censor if the censoring
device is not in-line with the path between the client and the target target and thus can
not discard the request. In this setup the censoring device is engaged in a race condition
against the legitimate response of the target server and its forged packets could arrive
after the target reply; this would make the client ignore the censor packets due to the
mismatch of the TCP sequence number11.
In the following some examples of multi-stage deployments are described.
TCP filtering + BGP hijacking + HTTP proxy
One of the first descriptions of a multi-stage deployment is provided in [Clayton, 2006]:
here the aforementioned reasons in favor of this kind of deployment are stated as moti-
vation for the design of the system. The first-stage is triggered by destination IP address
and TCP port number. In case of match, the packet is routed (by means of BGP) to an
HTTP proxy that can access the hostname and the specific resource (second-stage trig-
ger). Allowed URLs are fetched from the original target and served back to the client,
11the initial sequence number is randomly generated to to make harder for an off-path attacker to guess
it [Gont and Bellovin, 2012].
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while blacklisted ones will trigger an action of the kind reported in Section 2.3.7 - in
[Clayton, 2006] requests are ignored, thus the client waits in vain until the timeout is
struck.
DNS hijacking + HTTP proxy
This technique is triggered by DNS queries (UDP port 53) of type A, i.e. requiring
the translation of a hostname belonging to a blacklist; the censoring DNS server replies
providing an IP address that belongs to the second-stage surveillance device. Then the
browser establishes a TCP connection directly with the second-stage surveillance device.12
To an HTTP GET request including an URL belonging to a blacklist (secondary trigger)
the second-stage censoring device replies with one of the actions seen in Section 2.3.7. If
the requested URL was not blacklisted then the request is let pass.
Keyword blocking + TCP disruption
The trigger is constituted by a TCP/port 80 (HTTP) packet containing an HTTP GET
request for the target URL13 and as IP destination address the target ’s address.
If the URL contains a blacklisted keyword then the TCP connection disruption
This deployment has been found operating in China and has been analyzed in detail,
showing evolution in complexity over time [Clayton et al., 2006, Feng and Guo, 2012,
Polverini and Pottenger, 2011, Verkamp and Gupta, 2012, Weaver et al., 2009, Xu et al.,
2011], with different levels of sophistication in the craft of RST packets14. The analysis
revealed stateful implementations for both stages: only the HTTP request belonging to a
correctly established TCP connection triggers the censorship, while after it has been acti-
vated all packets sharing the 5-tuple (IP source and destination addresses, TCP transport
protocol, source and destination ports) generates the TCP connection disruption action
[Xu et al., 2011].
12If HTTPS is employed, at this point the browser attempts a TLS session establishment, that will fail
unless a TLS compelled certificate creation attack has been performed (see Section 2.3.8). If the user,
uncaring or unaware of the risk, allows the browser to accept the invalid certificate anyway, then the
process continues as if HTTP were used.
13the payload of the TCP packet contains the strings of the query part of the URL (after the GET
string) and the hostname part of the URL (following the Host: string).
14see [Weaver et al., 2009] for an experimental survey of the types of packets forged by censoring devices
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2.4 Circumvention
A logical consequence from the awareness of censorship and progress on understanding
its working details is the proposal of methods to dodge it, collectively named censorship
circumvention (just “circumvention” in the following). Besides papers focused on circum-
vention itself, often papers discussing censorship and censorship detection add also the
related analysis of possible circumvention methods: references to both cases are provided
hereafter in the form of a brief survey of literature on circumvention.
Methods, tools and platforms have been specifically designed to counter censorship: in
[Elahi and Goldberg, 2012] a taxonomy is presented that characterizes thirty among cir-
cumvention tools, platforms and techniques according to a number of properties, namely:
the ability to make censorship damages outweigh its benefits, avoiding censor control over
entities or traffic, avoiding censors surveillance, and other means along these main ones.
Another valuable source for scientific literature on censorship and circumvention is the
webpage “Selected Papers in Censorship”15.
The early analysis of network-based censorship techniques [Dornseif, 2003] cites a num-
ber of possible circumvention techniques: for each a brief analysis is presented, considering
which censorship technique is circumvented and what is needed by the user to apply the
technique, concluding that albeit several workarounds are possible they can be techni-
cally complex, burdensome or needing collaboration by a third party, thus resulting not
easy to be applied for a common user.
A few techniques for circumvention of application-level keyword-based censorship are
suggested in Crandall et al. [2007]. These techniques are based on the knowledge of the
blacklist of keywords that trigger censorship, and are described as asymmetric techniques
in the sense that are server-based and do not require changes in the client. We note
that while some of them - namely IP packet fragmentation, insertion of HTML comments
and varying characters encoding- exploit standard functionalities of the stack on the client
that could virtually be unaffected and provide results equivalent to the non-mangled com-
munication, other (captcha, spam-like rewording) likely will disrupt automatic functions
such as indexing and text search and are meant solely for human interpretation.
In [Clayton et al., 2006] a technique is presented to circumvent a specific censorship
(TCP-RST communication disruption) by ignoring the forged RST packets, also consider-
15www.cs.kau.se/philwint/censorbib/
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ing TTL-based validation to identify forged RSTs from legitimate ones. The implications
are discussed (adopting a non-RFC-compliant stack on both web server and client) and
compared with the use of encryption. New censorship techniques and variants namely
Revised Sequence Number Prediction Attack, Forged SYN-ACK Response (detected and
described in [Polverini and Pottenger, 2011]) suggest that the proposed circumvention
technique is no more effective.
A recent field survey on circumvention techniques in China has been published as tech-
nical report in [Robinson et al., 2013]: listed circumvention tools are Freegate16, Ultra-
Surf17, web proxies, SSH, while only 16% used personal VPNs; according to the authors,
a 15% that didn’t tell the name of the tool possibly use GAppProxy18, predecessor of
GoAgent19 tool.
Even if not specifically designed for censorship circumvention, anonymity technologies
can and have been used to circumvent censorship: a recent survey on usage and geograph-
ical distribution of several technologies including proxy servers, remailers, JAP, I2P, and
Tor is provided in [Li et al., 2013].
The availability of Internet Censorship detection and monitoring tools is a strict re-
quirement for the development and evolution of circumvention technologies: this adds
another motivation to the present Thesis work.
16http://www.dit-inc.us/freegate
17https://ultrasurf.us/
18http://gappproxy.sourceforge.net/
19https://code.google.com/p/goagent/ (documentation in Chinese)
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Chapter 3
Detection of Internet Censorship
To be able to carry on an informed discussion and analysis of censorship, is of paramount
importance the ability to assess and understand its actual usage. In fact significant
aspects of censorship, such as its enforceability, its transparency and the accountability
of the censors to the affected population, strongly depend on the technical details of the
adopted censorship technique and thus evolve with the technology and real usage of it.
The evidence of censorship is fundamental to raise the awareness in international
scenarios of the social cost of censorship methods. Finally, side effects of the application
of censorship (dubbed “overblocking”), that play a major role in the ethical, political and
economical feasibility of its enforcement, are also bound to the technical details of the
adopted method.
In coherence with the definition of Internet Censorship we have adopted in Section 2.2,
we consider the Internet Censorship Detection1 as “the process that, analyzing network
data, proves the existence of impairments in the access to content and services caused by
a third party (neither the client system nor the server hosting the resource or service)
and not justifiable as an outage”. We implicitly include the collection of the suitable
network traffic data in the Internet Censorship Detection as it is a fundamental phase of
the process. We also note that, as stated in Chapter 2, in the present work the focus is
on Network-based Censorship, and thus Detection refers, unless differently stated, to the
related techniques (Section 2.1.3).
Detection is essentially based on the ability to tell the effect of the censorship from
the “normal” uncensored result and from involuntary outages; for a class of detection
methods (active detection), it requires also the possibility of intentionally triggering the
1hereafter also “detection”, when no ambiguity would derive
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supposed censorship system. The inference of the adopted censorship technique is inherent
to identifying the type of third party causing the impairment and its differentiation from
an outage.
With reference and in addition to definitions stated in Section 2.2, censorship detection
techniques can be characterized considering two main aspects:
viewpoint : the role of the probe host in the client-server communication model:
client-based : collected network traffic is initiated by the same IP address of the
probe host;
gateway-based : collected traffic has neither source nor destination IP addresses
belonging to the same network of the probe; in the scenario of interest the probe
host is a gateway towards Internet: all traffic between the served network and
the Internet passes through it;
server-based : collected network traffic is initiated by other addresses towards the
same IP address of the probe host;
collection : the collection of network traffic data can be performed with active or passive
techniques
active collection : techniques that use client systems (“probes”) to generate net-
work traffic purposely crafted for possibly eliciting a censorship response (to
be recorded and analyzed).
passive detection : techniques that collect traffic data from network application
logs or traffic traces captured on the device (“probe”) in order to look for
evidence of censorship events;
A special case crossing these definitions is the usage of active methods towards a
controlled destination: as both sides of the communication are controlled (both qualify as
“probe”) then traffic can be collected also at the receiver side (passive collection method).
As for the viewpoint, if both edges are controlled then once the server receives client traffic
can also respond with a purposely crafted reply (e.g. containing a second-stage trigger for
a stateful censorship system); finally, probes can switch role, allowing directed testing of
the network paths in-between. This setup is akin to the one used in the methods of network
tomography [Castro et al., 2004], thus in analogy we name it “censorship tomography”,
as a special case of active methods. In fact even though censorship tomography implies
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logging of received traffic, the possibility to generate traffic purposely forged to trigger
some specific mechanisms is the essential property that characterizes active methods.
3.1 Active detection methods
For active censorship detection tools, the algorithm consists in the following steps:
• generate traffic towards a target, supposed reachable;
• if the request gets back no results or an error then censorship is inferred;
• if the received content is equal to a Ground Truth or satisfies a similarity criterion,
then the target is considered reachable and not subject to censorship
In order to analyze the censorship technique, variations on the request can be made
to pinpoint the trigger : by comparing the symptoms collected for the different tries,
information about both the trigger and the action is obtained and then existence and
properties of the censoring system can be inferred. We stress that, without the ability to
selectively investigate the censoring technique mechanics, a detection tool can hardly tell
censorship from outage, as it is the coupling (trigger,symptom) confronted with the case
(non-trigger,expected uncensored behavior) that can surface the existence and nature of a
censoring infrastructure and thus the intentionality of the communication impairment.
3.1.1 DNS resolution
A widespread censoring techniques involves the DNS resolution process, that is involved
every time a symbolic name for the host is provided (see Section 2.3.2). Possible variants
involve ISPs altering their copy of the distributed DNS database so that a wrong reply
is given to clients (“DNS hijacking”) ; or a in-line censoring device intercepting the DNS
queries and replying in place of the intended DNS server (“DNS injection”).
From the detection point of view the cases of the complacent ISP and the one of
the intercepting device can be told apart by querying alternative Name Servers hosted
outside of the censored network [Nabi, 2013]: if the forged Resource Record is only in
the database of the ISP’s default Name Servers, the alternative Name Server will provide
different (correct) answers; in case an intercepting device is actively tampering the DNS
traffic then all responses will be equivalent (and wrong), and detection will be possible only
by comparing results with the ones collected from probes outside the censored network.
Active detection methods 34
Limiting the analysis to just the Name Resolution phase, in case of DNS tampering
a comparison with results of measurements from other countries will show that a given
(censored) host name is resolved to two different sets of IP addresses. Unfortunately, this
is also the case for DNS-based load balancing and more in general performance enhance-
ment usually provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) [Pathan and Buyya, 2008].
Therefore a detection test that compares the set of resolved addresses of a hostname
among different countries would systematically suffer of false positive errors specially for
high-traffic addresses (mostly likely to leverage CDNs). This test can instead be used as
an exclusion criterion: if the two sets are identical, then no DNS-based censorship has
been applied for the considered resource.
In [Gill et al., 2013] a method is proposed to infer DNS tampering (there named “DNS
redirection”) by considering all the hostnames resolved to one same IP address in the test
results, and count the number of different ASes the same hostnames are resolved to by a
trusted DNS server: if the AS count is greater than an empirically set threshold 2 then
the response of DNS tampering is given.
3.1.2 IP reachability
Reachability of a target at the network level has been performed since the early days
of the deployment of Internet by means of the standard utilities ping and traceroute
[Jacobson, 1999].
The first one is an user-level interface to send ICMP echo requests messages to an
host, receiving back an echo reply demonstrating the mutual reachability of the two,
i.e. that directed paths forth and back exist between the sender and the receiver.
The original traceroute also used ICMP echo request packets, but with an increasing
TTL counter, so that at each expiration an ICMP time-exceeded error from the last
reached router would be returned, altogether with the router IP address; basically col-
lecting the sequence of addresses the path between the sender and the destination would
be discovered hop-by-hop.
These techniques can carry only triggers of kind source/destination IP address, thus
they are useful to pinpoint censorship techniques of type IP-based filtering (Section 2.3.3).
There are several possible causes of inaccuracy or unresponsiveness [Luckie et al., 2008,
2the threshold is set to 32 ASes considering the rate of growth of the percentage of blocking detected
with other methods [Gill et al., 2013, appendix A.1].
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Marchetta and Pescape´, 2013] that would lead to false positives when using this techniques
as censorship tests), thus using them alone has limited usefulness.
Both ping and traceroute have been used in [Feng and Guo, 2012] as a preliminary
active detection technique.
Variations on the traceroute technique are described in Section 3.1.5.
3.1.3 TCP reachability
In order to test if censoring techniques of type packet filtering or TCP connection disrup-
tion (Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 respectively) are employed by the censoring system all is
needed is a tool able to log transport and network level errors when sending TCP pack-
ets with the suitable trigger. A tool to start probing with the minimum trigger towards a
target has just to try a three-way handshake: netcat 3, a mature ad widely used tool for
network diagnostic and security testing, has been adopted for this purpose [Clayton et al.,
2006].
Often the detection techniques adopted in research papers or in the provided platforms
and tools just leverage the application level log files and error reporting functionality to
detect the disruption of TCP connection [Aryan et al., 2013, Gill et al., 2013, Nabi, 2013,
Polverini and Pottenger, 2011] e.g. triggering the system directly by sending a - possibly
innocuous - HTTP GET request (see following section). At the other end of the spectrum
of possibilities there is the technique adopted in [Khattak et al., 2013], generating different
of combination of initial packets (with different flags set) in order to test a censoring device
statefulness.
3.1.4 HTTP tampering
The detection of censorship techniques of type HTTP tampering (Section 2.3.6) is the most
frequent in literature, being considered virtually by all the censorship-related papers cited
so far.
The common procedure is to use an application to request a resource by means of
the HTTP protocol, the trigger being set in the header section of the HTTP request,
either in the query part of the GET request - that is interpreted as a path to a resource
on the server -, or in the Host: header field - that is interpreted as the hostname and
3http://netcat.sourceforge.net/
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used to identify one specific website if many are hosted at the same IP address (“virtual
hosting”).
The main source of variation is the specific tool adopted to generate an HTTP GET
request, comprising Python scripting [Filasto` and Appelbaum, 2012, Gill et al., 2013,
Nabi, 2013], the command line common unix utility wget [Polverini and Pottenger, 2011],
or more exotic tools such as fragroute 4 [Park and Crandall, 2010] and scapy 5
[Crandall et al., 2007, Khattak et al., 2013].
In case a censorship tomography setup is adopted, an helper server is used to re-
ceive the requests (usually with no trigger) and reply back with a blacklisted keyword
in the content of the response HTTP message. Such a setup has been proposed in
[Filasto` and Appelbaum, 2012] using programmable back-ends, and previously adopted
by Park and Crandall [2010] to detect HTTP response filtering in the Great Firewall of
China (found to be dismissed). Recently Khattak et al. [2013] have adopted this setup
to investigate the details of statefulness (and more in general the vulnerability to circum-
vention) of the GFC.
In case the censoring system successfully submits a -potentially mangled- content,
the ultimate detection technique to check whether a resource has been tampered with
would be to compare the received content against a Ground Truth. If the content is
an HTML page of a dynamic web site a verbatim comparison would almost surely fail,
as there are variable components such as timestamps, localization effects, and in general
every dynamic content managed through server-side scripting would vary the HTML code
downloaded by different clients. A tentative to overcome this variability has been proposed
in [Sfakianakis et al., 2011] that uses three tests on content: (i) an MD5 hash is taken for
both the retrieved and the Ground Truth version: if they coincide there is no censorship;
otherwise the relevant content is extracted for both webpages by means of the Readability
6 algorithm and (iii) the result is compared with a fuzzy hashing technique [Kornblum,
2006] to obtain a similarity score to base the decision on.
4http://www.monkey.org/∼dugsong/fragroute/
5http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy
6https://www.readability.com/developers/api
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3.1.5 Topology-aware Detection
Some detection techniques focus on the topology of the network when probing for cen-
sorship. In fact variations of the ICMP-based traceroute technique leverage other kind
of probing packets (TCP or UDP) using either varying port numbers (UDP) or different
sequence numbers (TCP) to identify the hop that elicited the ICMP time-exceeded er-
ror. Thus a TCP packet initiating a connection (or carrying payload in an established
connection) can be sent with increasing TTL to discover if and where (in terms of path
hops) the blocking is enforced.
An example of these techniques can be found in [Xu et al., 2011], where the location
of censorship-enforcing boxes is found by exploiting the behavior of the specific censoring
system - namely, the Great Firewall of China (GFC). The peculiar behavior in discussion
is related to the statefulness of the censoring system, as detected by [Clayton et al., 2006]
and recalled briefly in the following.
In the GFC not all the packets are inspected by the system, but only the ones oc-
curring in a correctly established TCP connection to a webserver (TCP port 80); in such
connections Deep Packet Inspection techniques are used to match character strings (key-
words belonging to a blacklist): once a blacklisted string is found, forged RSTs directed
to both endpoints shut down the connection, and every further connection between the
same endpoints is replied with forged RSTs regardless of the packets content, for a fixed
timespan. Thus the censoring system “remembers” the connection and behaves differ-
ently according to the kind of communication that happened before, in other words the
state of the connection is kept, hence the statefulness of the system.
The statefulness of the Chinese censoring system has changed over time: Crandall et al.
[2007], Polverini and Pottenger [2011], Xu et al. [2011] found it being stateful with no ex-
ceptions, as a TCP packet containing an HTTP GET request with a blacklisted string would
constitute a trigger only if sent after a valid TCP connection establishment.
In the characterization of censorship techniques that we have proposed in Section 2
this censoring system adopts network-based censorship summarized in Figure 2.5.
The probing technique in discussion is aimed at detecting and topologically locat-
ing devices that enforce keyword-based censorship. It uses a first-stage trigger of type
TCP-port-80, HTTP-header-keyword to activate filtering towards a website inside the
censored network; after the activation a traceroute-like sequence of packets with trig-
ger simply IP-destination,TCP-port-80 is sent until the reception of an RST signals the
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finding of the censoring device. More detail is provided in the algorithm pseudocode in
Fig. 3.1.
1 for target in targetlist do
2 check HTTP reachability with neutral GET
3 if target is reachable then
4 try HTTP GET with ‘‘FALUN’’ keyword
5 wait 5 seconds
6 if no RST is received then
7 target is whitelisted
8 next for
9 else repeat:
10 hop=hop+1
11 send ACK to target with TTL=hop
12 if response is RST then
13 censorIP=(last saved IP)
14 censordistance=hop
15 exit repeat
16 elseif response is ICMP Time Exceeded then continue repeat
17 end repeat
18 end if
19 end if
20 end for
Figure 3.1: Topology-aware detection: pseudocode describing the location algorithm for Chinese Great
Firewall presented in [Xu et al., 2011] (as interpreted by the writer, from the textual description).
3.1.6 Soft-censorship detection
Detection of soft censorship activities requires the possibility to measure impairments in
access to online services and resources. This kind of detection is rooted in techniques from
the field of performance measurements and Quality of Service estimation and monitoring.
An example of detection of throttling is found in [Anderson, 2013], in which the au-
thor applies statistical analysis on measurement data collected by µTorrent clients whose
IP addresses are geolocated in Iran. The performed measurements are executions of Net-
work Diagnostic Tool [Carlson, 2003] tests against M-lab servers outside the country un-
der analysis (mostly Greece , U.S.A. and U.K.). Considered performance parameters are
Round-Trip Time (minimum and average), Packet Loss, Network-limited Time Ratioand
Network Throughput. Measurements are aggregated along three axes: country-level, ASN
and network prefixes, control group (defined as “logical, coherent groups of networks and
clients based on common characteristics, such as the nature of the end user or perfor-
mance”, assuming that sets of privileged users - government agencies, banks, commercial
customers - are subjected to different policies than the rest). The detection of significant
events (suggestive of censorship activities) is based on thresholds (trend-based minimum
Passive detection methods 39
and maximum bounds) and variance among different aggregates (assuming that natural
variance is high, while when external limitations are imposed variance will be low).
3.2 Passive detection methods
3.2.1 Server-based Detection
Server-based Internet Censorship Detection methods belong to the passive detection cat-
egory, taking the evidence on which performing the analysis from traffic traces and appli-
cation logs. Such data collected at a server is indipendently generated by the customers
when accessing the provided online services, thus it is limited in two aspects: (i) the only
target is the server itself; (ii) the triggers are limited to the service protocol. Depending
on the service architecture it can constitute a single viewpoint (service hosted on one sin-
gle host) or multiple viewpoints (for a service hosted on a distributed platform, by means
of a Cloud platform or a CDN).
The main server-side method for detection of censorship is applying statistical analysis
to the number and origin of clients connecting to the server. This kind of detection relies
on the hypothesis that censorship events are country-wise in scope, and requires the
possibility of tracking at least the country that is source of the connections, e.g. relying
on IP address - to ISP - to country mappings, also named IP Geolocation7. Examples of
statistical server-based censorship detection activities are the Google Transparency Report
- Traffic page8 and the TOR metrics portal9.
Another example of server-side censorship detection is the case of google analysis on
reported malfunctioning of the search engine from mainland China users10: the presence
of some specific characters in a search query caused the connection to google website to
be interrupted for a minute or more, showing ”The connection was reset” error. Google
response was to warn the user when the “sensitive” keywords (characters possibly con-
tained in simple everyday use words). This practice has been quietly discontinued, as
reported by Greatfire [GFC, 2013]11.
7An example of service offering this mapping both as for-pay service or in lower-quality unsupported
public available version, is given by MaxMind http://dev.maxmind.com/geoip/geolite
8http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/traffic
9https://metrics.torproject.org
10described in a blog post in the official Google blog: http://insidesearch.blogspot.tw/2012/05/
better-search-in-mainland-china.html
11https://en.greatfire.org/blog/2013/jan/google-bows-down-chinese-government-censorship
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Self-exposed server-based censorship
A peculiar case to be considered is a form of server-based detection of server-based censor-
ship. Explicit requests of blocking target content are issued to Online Service Providers:
a notable example is given by Google Transparency Report - Removal Requests 12 that
discloses a summary of requests from governments or from copyright owners to block ac-
cess to specific content. While the actual targets are not disclosed, a categorization of
removal requests is done according to the reason and the type of requester and the re-
lated statistics are provided. At the time of writing (March 2014) considered reasons are
most prominently Defamation, Privacy and Security, and then (each accounting for less
than 5% and decreasing): Government Criticism, Impersonation, Adult Content, Hate
Speech, Violence, Copyright, National Security, Religious Offense, Trademark, Electoral
Law; Other (about 18%). A breakdown is provided according to the origin of the request:
“court orders” or “executive, police, etc.”, the first type being prominent for category
“Defamation”. For each country also the extent of non-compliance with the requests is
given, along with the reason for not abiding by the requests. An interesting “out-of-band”
channel is offered to users willing to notify the unavailability of Google services (and pos-
sibly of Internet connection): three phone numbers are provided to leave a voice message
that will be automatically tweeted with hashtag indicating which region the calling num-
ber is located (when detected).
3.3 Censorship Detection Platforms and Tools
The tools and platforms employed for Internet Censorship Detection or Monitoring are
not numerous but quite heterogeneous. A common baseline can be abstracted from their
nature of tests: as such the detection can be broken down in the same components and
phases described in the previous section. Besides this, they differ in the approaches
that have been adopted such as the degree of automation adopted, ranging from testers
having to run manual checks [Feng and Guo, 2012] up to virtually unmanned censorship
monitoring platforms [Sfakianakis et al., 2011], or between centralized control Herdict to
completely distributed [Filasto` and Appelbaum, 2012].
12http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government
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3.3.1 Herdict
The “Herdict” project [Herdict] is a crowd-sourced censorship monitoring project. Its
main interface consists of a website allowing users to report about “accessibility”of URLs
from within their browser; this way the platform leverages crowdsourcing both for the
collection of targets of interest for the users, and by having the users to perform an
application-level censorship test.
The URLs to be checked are both suggested by a limited number of affiliated organi-
zations and provided by the users themselves. In Figure 3.2 a screenshot 13 is shown of
the form for the submission of a test verdict: by clicking either on “accessible” or “in-
accessible” the user provides a verdict about the reachability at application level. The
simple mechanics of this method consists in providing the user some URLs of interest
and receive, together with her verdict on accessibility, also the IP address of the user (as
her browser is connected to the Herdict website), and a few accessory browser-related
data, so that the user location can be inferred through geolocation and the verdict can
be aggregated by the source IP of the user/probe.
An additional interface is provided by means of a browser module (“plug-in”) that:
(i) collects and sends to the Herdict platform the URL of each website visited by the
user, returning a response about the accessibility of that website according to the Herdict
database; (ii) allows the user to quickly report whether the website is accessible or not.
The first functionality can be disabled by the user. Moreover a registration form is
provided to the user to describe her location (that will be associated with all the user’s
report). This constitute another form of metadata collection about the condition of the
accessibility measurement.
Given the mechanics of this detection method, it can be considered as testing the
censorship of the targets at application level, as the whole protocol stack must have
worked unimpeded in order to provide the final result of the webpage rendering (thus
including HTML and script processing). Being more precise, as user judgment is involved
in assessing whether the results she sees are to be considered an “access” or not, this
should be considered an “user-level” 14 censorship test.
13as of March 2014
14a humorous expression with some popularity is “at layer 8”, with reference to the 7 layers of the
ISO/OSI network model [Ross and Kurose, 1999], the upper one being the application protocol (roughly
corresponding to the top sublayer of TCP/IP application layer).
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This project has both interesting strong points and inherent shortcomings. The strong
aspects can be summarized as
low adoption bar: the user doesn’t have to install any software besides a JavaScript-
enabled 15 browser; moreover no technical skills or specialistic knowledge is required
to operate the tests due to their basic nature;
quasi-real-time reports: results of checks from all the users are published in easy to
understand maps and graphs, besides downloadable CSV files;
crowd-sourced target lists: the users themselves can submit URLs that are of interest
to them and contextually report on their reachability, thus increasing the list of
considered URLs (though the lack of selection on this set is an issue).
Weak aspects of this project are intrinsic of its design:
single, basic, subjective test: the project is designed to perform a simple web page
visibility test, i.e. the user is requested to state if the target URL is visible or not:
this on the one side relies on the expectations of the user on the appearance of the
webpage and its correct rendering in the browser frame, on the other doesn’t give
any detail of the reason/technique of blocking;
unselected input: as target URLs are provided by users themselves with no filtering
or selection, irrelevant URLs (of no interest for the censors to block) or simply
misspelled ones (uselessly crowding the “unreachable” list) can and are introduced;
filtering out these cases is not a trivial task;
error or falsification prone output: for an user to report wrong results is as easy as
clicking “accessible” instead of “inaccessible”, so both mistakes and falsification
of results are trivially introduced: this worsens the issue of verifiability of results,
common to most if not all the censorship monitoring platforms that rely on user
input;
user activity required: the user must actively go to the project website and actively
endure the reporting procedure: this implies that there is no way to control the time
15[Hoehrmann, 2006]
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or the targets that are checked; moreover the users have minimal incentives to per-
form the checking and to come back and perform checks again besides the obvious
ethical motivation; this is partially mitigated by the plug-in browser interface, lim-
iting the user action to the minimum (a click on the reporting button), but still the
user intentional activity is required.
3.3.2 CensMon
A complete architecture named CensMon, specifically designed for censorship detection,
is presented in [Sfakianakis et al., 2011]. As a monitoring architecture, it is designed for
continuous and automatic functioning, thus the “needle in a haystack” problem of selecting
targets worth checking has been addressed by feeding the system with URLs automatically
harvested from online sources. An abstracted representation of the CensMon architecture
is shown in Fig. 3.3.
One significant contribution from [Sfakianakis et al., 2011] is the presentation of the
first architecture specifically designed for Censorship Monitoring (opposed to spot de-
tection). The study of this architecture has inspired UBICA for the closed-loop control
design, albeit this aspect in CensMon was minor and considered at a very basic level.
Another contribution is the practical solution they provide for the “needle in a haystack”
problem [Invernizzi et al., 2012] (though they do not elaborate on this aspect, and sim-
ply describe the source of information used to gather inputs for the detection algorithm).
A brief description of such sources is reported in the following.
User Input: collection of URLs provided by the users of the system through the user
interface
OpenNet Initiative’s Herdict Web [Herdict]: periodical scraping of the online re-
port of tested URLs.
Google Alerts16on selected topics: subscribing to the topics internet censorship, net
neutrality, freedom of speech and human rights, a daily report by email on the
relevant search results on the topics is fetched by IMAP client, processed and fed
to the system.
16http://www.google.com/alerts
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Internet Trends: Google Hot Trends 17 and Twitter 18 are scraped for keywords; these
are used to query google and take the top-10 results for each trend. No details are
given in [Sfakianakis et al., 2011] on how the keywords are inferred from the trends,
we speculate that techniques for keyword extraction like Latent Semantic Analysis
[Crandall et al., 2007] can be applied.
Search of ONI categories: the list of categories that the Open Net Initiative [ONI] has
defined for censorship targets is considered to extract 10 keywords (news outlets,
freedom of speech, entertainment, government, terrorism, porn, gambling, religion,
net neutrality and human rights); for each the top-100 results from the Google
search engine are considered.
3.3.3 OONI architecture
. The OONI project [OONI] is a censorship detection architecture that has been presented
in [Filasto` and Appelbaum, 2012] and at the time of writing (March 2014) is in active
development. It is a Free Software project, part of the wider [Tor Project] with which it
is tightly integrated.
The main component of the architecture (Figure 3.5) is the ooni-probe, that can per-
form several different tests in trying to access either the target or one of the back-ends
(oonib in the figure). The oonib component constitute a deployment of servers with the
role of helpers for tests that require the control of both sides of the communication. More-
orver they serve as repositories for the report of test results.
The tool is written in Python, benefiting from the high-level libraries available for this
language to deal with networking.
Censorship detection tests that are supported by ooniprobe are:
• Content Blocking Tests
– DNS Consistency
– HTTP Requests
– TCP Connect
• Traffic Manipulation Tests
– HTTP Invalid Request Line
– DNS Spoof
– HTTP Header Field Manipulation
17https://www.google.com/trends/hottrends
18www.twitter.com
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– Traceroute
– HTTP Host
The first group (Content Blocking) can be performed by the probe used as a stan-
dalone, while the second group (Traffic Manipulation) requires the interaction with an
helper server.
The Content Blocking tests present two phases: (i) generation of probe traffic; (ii)
comparison of outcome against a ground truth.
The ground truth is obtained by means of the application Tor [Dingledine et al., 2004],
a transport-layer proxy providing access to an overlay network designed for privacy and
used also for censorship circumvention. In fact the Tor application running on the same
host of the probe offers to the local network applications a SOCKS 5 [Leech et al., 1996]
proxy server that tunnels TCP and UDP traffic in an encrypted circuit used to traverse the
surveillance device without exposing any trigger. Resources fetched through the tunnel
are considered as not tampered.
3.3.4 Tools for Censorship Detection
The complexity and specialization of Internet Censorship detection tools can vary. At
one end of the spectrum there is direct usage of applications (such as web browser, VPN
clients, overlay networks, etc.) to manually check their functioning. At a basic level, each
application can be considered an active testing tool of the application itself: tried from a
probe if it succeeds then is not censored, otherwise may be censored or not.
This approach has some evident shortcomings, namely:
• it is not possible or hard to tell intentional disruption of expected behavior from
technical issues;
• requires a full working installation for the tested application (limiting the deploy-
ment possibilities);
• it is hard to automate;
• the service information report of the application can be insufficient or hard to in-
terpret, not being designed for censorship detection.
In fact one of the considered platforms for censorship detection and reporting, [Her-
dict], is based on web-browser usage by users actively checking websites reachability. The
platform itself is a mean to address the shortcomings related with direct use of browsers
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as censorship detection tools, adding the missing functionalities that make Herdict a plat-
form and not a tool: (i) collection of targets; (ii) multiple viewpoints; (iv) reporting of
results.
Compared with detection platforms, tools are more limited in functionality, being
focused mainly on the measurement aspect, and lack most if not all of the automation
facilities offered by platforms, such as results collection, integration and analysis.
Samizdat
The tool used to gather the data analyzed in [Nabi, 2013] has been made available by the
author, and is hosted on GitHub 19.
The tool consists in a Python script that downloads from a blog URL20 the list of
targets to check for censorship then applies a list of tests of type DNS resolution, alternate
DNS resolver check, web content access, and a variation on keyword-based web access.
rTurtle
The data backing the analyses performed by The OpenNet Initiative [ONI] has been
collected by means of an undisclosed client, but a detailed analysis of the dataset has
been published in [Gill et al., 2013]. In this paper an algorithm for the detection of
censorship based on collected data is reported (see Fig. 3.6): if the test finds evidence
of blocking possible motivations are: DNS blocking, IP blocking, No HTTP Reply, RST,
Infinite HTTP Redirect, Block page. From the description of the tests it can be inferred
that this tool performs HTTP GET requests towards given targets and collection of the
HTTP replies or application-level logging of errors.
Alkasir
Alkasir is mainly meant as a circumvention tool dedicated to a restricted list of websites.
The tool is part of a system comprising a website [alkasir], a client application, and an
undisclosed set of proxies that are used to tunnel the user traffic towards blocked websites.
The tool is not open source, while it is downloadable for free. The list of URLs to which
access is granted is managed on a per-country basis: users are allowed to tunnel their
traffic through the alkasir proxies provided that the following conditions are all met:
19https://github.com/ZubairNabi/Samizdat
20http://propakistani.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/blocked.html
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• the user herself or another user from the same country has reported the URL as
blocked
• the operators of the alkasir system have policied the URL as complying to the alkasir
policies for URL submission21
• the alkasir systems validates that the submitted URL is blocked from the user
country
The submission of the URLs is allowed only through the Alkasir client, in the form of
a URL list. The user will be notified if and which URLs have been validated as being
blocked from her country and compliant with the URL submission policy.
The detection technique of the Alkasir tool is not disclosed. Nevertheless this system
has been considered among censorship detection tools as it actually serves as a detection
service, by publishing their blocking results.
A report of URLs considered as blocked by the system is given in the form of google
map embedded in the product website, reachable at the URL https://alkasir.com/map.
Web pages reporting per-country lists of blocked URLs are also provided.
The shortcomings of the Alkasir system as a censorship monitoring platform derive
mainly from its intended usage as a censorship circumvention tool: the analysis and
reporting of censorship is intended as a mean to limit the traffic that users can impose to
the alkasir servers, and does not have a monitoring objective besides this. The reason, as
stated in the website FAQs22, is that having limited resources (bandwidth, proxy servers),
the restriction of circumvention only to selected categories of resources that actually need
it is necessary to provide the service to a larger user base.
21https://alkasir.com/policy
22https://alkasir.com/faq
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Figure 3.2: The Herdict platform: a screenshot of the submission form. On the right a frame showing the target as retrieved by the browser
(in an i-frame), and below the two buttons to report: “accessible” or “inaccessible”. On the left a menu of URL lists proposed by affiliated
associations is shown.
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Figure 3.3: The CensMon architecture (from [Sfakianakis et al., 2011] Fig. 1).
INPUT: URL
1. distribution of URL to probes
2. DNS resolve → output: noerror, noxdomain, timeout, connre-
fused
3. TCP connect to resolved IP, port 80
4. URL filtering: keyword=URL postponed to WebHelper URL
(expecting 404not found)
5. HTTP access to URL, get status code, HTML (if redirection:
last URL and IP visited)
Server-side analysis:
6. DNS tampering:
6.1. (whois from server)
6.2. coherence of DNS resolution from different probes
7. HTML content check:
7.1. md5sum for coherence among probes
7.2. arc90 readability extraction → fuzzy hashing → compar-
ison among probes
8. inaccessibility event → probe that got it keeps monitoring the
URL
Figure 3.4: CensMon [Sfakianakis et al., 2011] detection procedure.
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Figure 3.5: OONI architecture, from [Filasto` and Appelbaum, 2012]
Figure 3.6: The Detection Algorithm on ONI data (from [Gill et al., 2013] Fig. 2).
Chapter 4
The UBICA platform
4.1 UBICA design properties
From the analysis of the available platforms it has emerged that each of them presents
a number of shortcomings, and none fully embodies a platform performing the complete
cycle of censorship monitoring activities from the collection of targets to the publication
of responses. UBICA has thus been designed to be a sustainable platform for censorship
monitoring. By sustainable we mean that it has to: (i) foster user adoption (being directly
useful to the user); (ii) generate the less probe traffic for both probes and targeted services.
Indeed disregarding user participation and generated network load is a notable deficiency
of known censorship detection and monitoring platforms, thus these goals constitute an
advance on the state of the art with the intent of providing a valuable contribution to the
human rights watch activities. The addition of sustainability to the base requirements
for a censorship monitoring platform leads to the list of desired properties and features
reported in Fig. 4.1.
UBICA design properties 52
• incentives to user adoption;
• user privacy consciousness;
• support for a diverse probe set (multiple vantage points and
sources of information);
• platform-wide test management:
– probes grouping;
– per-group test upgrade;
– per-group test activation;
– per-group test parameters tailoring;
• an expandable censorship detection test set
• a closed-loop control system
• consider resource as uncensored unless censorship evidence
• a reporting system with different interfaces:
– for the users running the probes, with user-centered de-
tailed data
– for the researchers running the platform
– for the public, with aggregate data graphs and maps
– for the public, in open data formats, with raw anonymized
test results
Figure 4.1: Design properties and features of the UBICA platform.
Other aspects have been set aside from the primary goals, but have been considered
in order to be supported:
• resistance to censorship of the platform itself
• distribution of probes in censoring countries
According to Burnett and Feamster [2013], the following principles should be adopted to
help guarantee robust and accurate monitoring of censorship:
1 Correlate independent data sources.
2 Separate measurement from analysis.
3 Separate information producers from information consumers.
4 Employ “dual-use” scenarios wherever possible, to improve robustness.
5 Adopt existing techniques to provide robust channels for measuring, reporting, and
accessing reports.
6 Heed and adapt to continually changing political and technical threats.
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These principles while have not been a blueprint for the design of the UBICA plat-
form still apply to its prototypical implementation: specifically principle 1 is fulfilled in
using sources for the collection of targets list that include also a reachability informa-
tion associated with targets; moreover the adoption of client types whose behavior can
be trusted (PlanetLab nodes and BISMark routers) enhances the diversity of informa-
tion sources; principle 2 is strictly respected, as there is an explicit separation between
the evidence collection phase and the censorship analysis and report; the same is valid
for principle 3, embodied in the different interfaces available for reporting results of evi-
dence collection and analysis; principle 4 is verified in the UBICA platform by leveraging
the BISMark and PlanetLab distributed platforms (designed and used for network exper-
iments and network performance measurements) as hosts for UBICA probes; finally the
automatic update functionality for both tests and clients helps in fulfilling principle 6 and
in adopting the means considered in principle 5;
The main objective of the UBICA platform is to provide the users with a censorship
monitoring system that presents both a report on world-wide Internet censorship status
and a quick view of censorship from her point of view (user-based). Three categories of
users are considered: researchers, that run and operate the platform backend infrastruc-
ture; the public users, provided with coarse-grained (country-level) reports; and volunteer
users, hosting UBICA clients and allowed the access to finer-grained reporting. In order
to gather data, the platform leverages a distributed deployment of probes belonging to
different kinds (router-based, headless client, gui-client) that are orchestrated by a cen-
tral management server. The platform is designed to provide: (i) dynamically updated
censorship tests; (ii) dynamically updated targets to be verified; (iii) support for different
types of probing clients; (iv) client-tailored tests; The execution of the tests is managed
by a scheduler that has the objectives of maximizing the coverage of targets while keeping
a low volume of probing traffic from each probe and towards each target.
With respect to the state of art, the goals and the properties of the platform are novel,
as no published censorship detection platform present all of them. Main novelties reside
in: (i) the continuous analysis of evidences; (ii) the interface with the user, providing an
incentive for the expansion and durability of the probe set and user base; (iii) the dynamic
scheduling of the evidence collection tests.
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4.1.1 Main differences with state of art
The platform most similar in goals and properties to the UBICA platform is CensMon
[Sfakianakis et al., 2011]; with regards to it, UBICA presents significant differences, re-
lated with the following properties of UBICA missing from CensMon:
• a diverse probe set (expanding on the one available to CensMon, Planetlab nodes);
• complex test management (upgrade, selective test activation, per-probe test param-
eters tailoring, aggregates of probe - campaigns);
• incentives to user adoption (an aspect structurally missing from CensMon as its
probes are not intended to be run on users premises);
• a reporting system, both for users and for the public (it can be imagined that
CensMon has an interface for queries and reports, even if it’s not described in the
paper).
Due to the its interface to humans, UBICA includes components that are missing from
CensMon, namely a Graphical User Interface for the probe, and a Reporting Portal with
three interfaces according to the role of the user (public, volunteer, and researcher).
Another comparable architecture is OONI, with which the main architectural differ-
ences of UBICA are
• centralized control
• test distribution and execution management
• server-based censorship analysis on the whole DB
• closed control loop
• not coupled with Tor (but possible integration)
• incentives for users adoption through probe GUI
An implementation difference between UBICA and the OONI architecture lies in the
probe: while ooniprobe is written in Python leveraging a powerful but voluminous library
(Twisted Matrix 1) as a core of its event-driven networking engine, UBICA deploys dif-
ferent kinds of probes that can be as lightweight as an ASH 2 script calling half dozen
ubiquitous UNIX utilities.
Some differences derive from explicit design choices: OONI aims at being highly dis-
tributed with no control from a central entity. Moreover OONI’s goal is to provide an open
1twistedmatrix.com
2Almquist SHell, a basic POSIX shell implemented in busybox and dash.
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platform for generic censorship tests: this led to the choice of Python and the Twisted
Matrix framework to leverage an high-level event-driven programming platform; on the
other side this has raised the requirements for running the software probe, making it not
suitable for embedded systems such as home gateway routers. Another goal difference is
that UBICA is a monitoring platform (much more like CensMon) whereas OONI, al-
beit being generic and extensible, is a detection platform, thus neglecting or demanding
to other external systems aspects such as target collection, scheduling, and data analysis
and reporting.
4.2 Architecture design and implementation
The UBICA platform is designed having in mind different kinds of stakeholders: the
common citizen that wants to be informed about blocked resources and service from her
point of access to the Internet; the journalist or activist that looks for data about the
freedom of information in her country or other countries; the researcher in the field of
networking and social sciences, interested in worldwide evolution of Internet censorship.
The platform is based on the participation of volunteers that provide a limited part of
their bandwidth and CPU resources (as well as a few MB of disk space for temporary
files) running an UBICA probe, to perform the gathering of information about censorship
as experienced by their connection points. The volunteer may be interested in remaining
anonymous, and in order to protect her privacy the platform avoids using the probe IP
address in data processing and reporting, nor employs any identification data. Another
kind of stakeholder, though not explicitly considered in the design as an independent
actor, can take advantage of UBICA measurement: the provider of services that checks
her information from service logs against measurement towards her service from different
vantage points. This kind of user has no specific treatment and its usage of the platform
can be absorbed in the “journalist” kind of user. Another category of stakeholders is
represented by the censors themselves (governs, institutions, employers); these in principle
could be uncaring of publication of information about censorship as long as it remains
effective, but could as well be willing to limit the knowledge about the specific targets and
techniques, or willing to hide the presence of censorship altogether. The UBICA platform
is not designed to circumvent censorship of its services, but can adopt techniques of passive
censorship detection in case this would happen (Section 3.2).
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Actor Detail Suggestion
Volunteer - Router connection moderated
Volunteer - Client connection automatic
Volunteer - Standalone Country none
Non-Volunteer Country (if available) none
Table 4.1: Actors and Use Cases: the detail of the reports and the possibility of suggesting new resources
vary according to the Actor.
These stakeholders interact in different ways with the platform, mainly differentiated
by the fact that there is a volunteer running a probe from within the same access network
(defined as a range of IP addresses assigned to an access provider as returned by WHOIS
database query). This is summarized in Table 4.1.
The use cases describing how these actors interact with the platform are listed in the
following section.
4.2.1 Use cases
The common citizen
The generic user can access UBICA by means of the main web portal, that shows informa-
tion about the recent state of censorship as detected by the UBICA platform. The report
is specific for a country (preferentially detected by geolocating the user IP or provided
explicitly by the user).
The different actors that interact with the UBICA platform are represented in the Use
Case Diagram in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: The UBICA Use Case Diagram.
Use Cases involving the Probe subsystem of the UBICA platform are represented in
the Use Case Diagram in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: The Probe subsystem: Use Case Diagram
A schematic diagram of the UBICA architecture in shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: The UBICA architecture diagram.
4.2.2 Control loop
The UBICA management server operates following a control cycle that comprises several
phases, namely:
1. Collection of Targets
2. Scheduling of evidence collection
3. Evidence collection
4. Censorship Tests
5. Evidence reporting and data export
6. Update Targets and Scheduling criteria
During these phases, in order to perform its operations, the management server interacts
with external components such as sources of information, the platform probes, and clients
of the portal services. A visual representation of the control cycle that is executed by
the management server that governs the UBICA platform, and its relations with external
elements, is shown in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: The UBICA architecture: the control cycle.
4.2.3 Probe types
Router-based probes
The candidate has designed, implemented and deployed a version of the probe software
that can be run in the customized OpenWRT environment provided by the BISMark
platform. Specific requirements for this kind of probes are related with the limited
resources available for the device, above all the storage space and the RAM memory
space: the model adopted for the probes is equipped with 8MB Flash memory card and
64MB RAM partially used as RAM disk to accommodate temporary data.
These conditions led to the following design choices:
• use of standard UNIX utilities whenever available (most already included in the
adopted OS distribution;
• composition of several tools by means of Ash scripting;
• limited processing on the probe.
The embedded probes share most of the evidence collection code with the other UBICA
probes, the main differences being related to the scheduling and the deployment procedure.
Being developed as a BISMark component, the probe leverages the distribution plat-
Architecture design and implementation 60
form for the BISMark experiments and thus is provided as an OpenWRT package3. The
package comprises a Makefile taking care of moving the files in their place in the filesys-
tem and setting up the scheduling.
As regards scheduling, the heartbeat connection is tried in cycles spaced by 6 hours,
each cycle consisting in 6 executions spaced by 10 minutes; in crontab notation:
*/10 3,9,15,21 * * * /tmp/usr/bin/censorship-testing
The actual execution of evidence gathering procedures is always controlled by means of
the management server, and the aforementioned scheduling puts an upper bound to the
frequency of target distribution and testing rates.
The inclusion in the BISMark platform implies that other active probing experiments
can be running on the same device: in order to avoid mutual interference, a dedicated
mutual exclusion mechanism is introduced for this version of the probe, as can be seen in
the excerpt of listing in Fig. 4.6.
3 Publicly available at https://github.com/sburnett/bismark-packages/tree/
f383d68fdee2c5fbd027114c0cf355dc79e83f5a/utils/pakistan-censorship-testing
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492 t r i e s=1
493 while [ $ t r i e s − l t $max lo ck t r i e s ] ; do
494 date >&2
495 echo ” exp i r i n g pr ev i ous a c t i v e l o c k s . . . ” >&2
496 exp i r e a c t i v e mea sur ement s l o ck ; # ju s t in case
497 echo ” try to acqu i r e a c t i v e l o ck . . . ” >&2
498 i f acqu i r e a c t i v e mea sur ement s l o ck ; then
499 echo ” a c t i v e l o ck acqui r ed . . . ” >&2
500 break
501 else
502 echo ”FAILING to acqu i r e a c t i v e l o ck . . . ” >&2
503 echo ”wa it ing $wa i t lock seconds ” >&2
504 t r i e s=$ ( ( t r i e s + 1 ) )
505 s l e ep $wa it lock
506 f i
507 done
508 i f [ $ t r i e s −eq $max lo ck t r i e s ] ; then
509 echo ”WARNING could not a cqu i r e Active l o ck in $max lo ck t r i e s t r i e s ( $ ( (
wa i t l o ck ∗ max lo ck t r i e s ) ) s ) . ” >&2
510 echo ”ABORTING t e s t . ” >&2
511 exit 42
512 f i
. . .
595 # end o f c r i t i c a l s e c t i on . a f t e r t h i s j u s t an f t p upload i s performed .
596 echo ” r e l e a s i n g a c t i v e l o ck . . . ” >&2
597 i f r e l e a s e a c t i v e mea su r emen t s l o c k ; then
598 echo ” lo ck r e l e a s ed . ” >&2
599 else
600 echo ”ERROR $? r e l e a s i n g l o ck ” >&2
601 # weird . l e t ’ s pre tend i t never happened .
602 f i
Figure 4.6: Listing of router-based client: code implementing the Mutual Exclusion for active probings
on BISMark platform, enclosing the critical section where active measurements are performed.
This implies that there is a legitimate cause for the lack of reports from BISMark
probes that have successfully checked with the Management Server and have been assigned
a list of evidence gathering tests: it can happen that other active experiments are being
run on the probe, thus the execution of the test has been delayed until aborting. As it
can be seen in the listing in Fig. 4.6, the acquisition of the mutex lock is tried up to
$maxlocktries times (default 5), each time waiting for $waitlock seconds (default 10)
after a failure.
Other minor differences lie in the absence of failure report regarding test running as
errors are captured by the script itself and appended to the testing report: in case the
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BISMark platform fails to run the script, no reports are uploaded at all, and if any partial
data collection has been performed it is cleaned up to prevent storage exhaustion.
A clue of this event can be found in missed reports for probes that did regularly contact
the management server with the heartbeat connection and were scheduled for testing at
least one target.
UBICA client
The probe version that leverages best the features of the UBICA platform is dubbed
”UBICA client” and is distributed as a binary developed for Linux (tested on Ubuntu
versions), Windows and Mac OS X operating systems. It is based on the client of the
HoBBIT platform [de Donato et al., 2014], designed for network performance measure-
ments. The specific features provided by this kind of probe are related with a tighter
integration with the Management Server and a richer interaction with the user, plus
management-friendly properties and can be summarized as:
• a Graphical User Interface (GUI)
• automatic update of experiment definition
• automatic update of the client code
• detection of mobility (and user interaction)
• detailed debug report for measurement failures
With respect to the HoBBIT client, the main differences lay in the initial registration
phase, and in the reporting of the experiment results. In the registration phase (activated
at the first usage of the client and checked periodically) a number of data about the user
location and connection contract are asked to the user by means of a graphical form; when
these are communicated to the Management Server, an identification code is returned to
associate the client with a class of vantage points (depending on the access network and
an user-supplied classification of her connection). In order to better protect the privacy
of the UBICA user, with the side benefit to improve the usability of the application, this
registration phase is limited to ask the “location type” of the connection by selecting it
from a list, while the access network is derived server-side by storing the range of IP
addresses the client address is assigned from. The reporting of the experiment results
is not performed, as in the HoBBIT client, by means of a direct XML interaction with
the Management Server, but instead through the upload of a cumulative, self-coherent
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archive including the input parameters and the resulting data from the experiment. This
is done both to decouple the request of experiment metadata from the execution of the
experiment and the upload of the results, and to more easily support the heterogeneous
set of probes that can participate in the collection of evidence data.
The overall control cycle of the UBICA client is represented as Activity Diagram in
Figure 4.7. This control flow is repeated endlessly during the execution of the application
unless the user explicitly closes it.
Figure 4.7: UBICA client: Activity Diagram - overall control cycle.
The main activities performed during the control cycle are: (i) check for presence
of a newer version of the client and if available update it (Update activity); (ii) check of
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user network mobility and registration of the new measurement environment (Registration
activity) and (iii) the management of measurements (Measurement activity). The Update
activity is subject to a timeout then takes precedence over the other activities. This is a
cautionary approach: in case a bug affecting the behavior of the old client or the quality
of the measurements has been fixed, the old client is dismissed as soon as possible in favor
of the updated one. The drawback of this approach is that all the updates are considered
of maximum priority. Future enhancement could implement two categories of updates:
preemptive and non-preemptive ones, the former to be reserved for important fixes while
the latter can be deferred after the completion of measurements or even made optional
according to user choice.
In the following each of the three main activities are described in further detail.
Automatic client Update The first phase of the UBICA client control flow is the
check for newer versions of the binary for its same platform, and if present download it,
overwrite the binary and restart itself. This function is activated either when the client
is run, or on a periodic timing (4h maximum). In case an error occurs (either for lack
of connectivity to the server, or a server error), the client recovers nicely by skipping the
update, that will be attempted again after the update period times out. After the update
check, the presence of a working network connection is verified again, and if available the
control flow continues with mobility detection / registration.
Registration - Mobility detection The censorship monitoring performed by the
UBICA platform leverages the knowledge of the network the client measures from, with
the granularity of an address range (e.g. 192.168.1.0-192.168.1.255). In case of a no-
madic user (changing his connection network) the platform detects the potential change
of network and optionally prompts the user with a question about the “location type” he
is at, then obtains from the Management Server a connection ID that will be used from
this time on to identify the type of client.
The control flow of the registration phase is shown as an Activity Diagram in Fig-
ure 4.8. The activities are positioned on different lanes according to the object that is
responsible for it, with the exception of the rightmost lane that represents the Manage-
ment Server. Interactions between the client and the Management Server are performed
by means of synchronous messages exchange through the network.
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The detection of mobility (i.e. the user changing access network) is based on the
detection of the MAC address of the gateway router: a change to this layer-2 address is
considered as a possible change of network. In order to detect the change of the MAC
address without revealing information to the platform, a hash value derived from the
MAC address is stored along with the “location type” provided by the user, in a file
in the installation directory of the client. This (key,value) local database is queried each
time a connection check is performed: in case a match is found the corresponding location
is considered and the user is not bothered with questions, when no match is found the
nature of the new location is asked to the user, the database is updated and the updated
connection ID is requested to the server.
Figure 4.8: UBICA client: control flow of the Registration activity.
Measurement TheMeasurement activity constitutes the part of control flow that takes
care of checking with the Management Server the list of measurements to be performed,
update the measurement definitions if necessary, update the measurement parameters
if necessary, perform the measurements and report back to the Management Server the
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results. The measurement activity of the UBICA client is represented in Figure 4.9 and
described hereafter.
Figure 4.9: UBICA client: control flow of Measurement activity
The Activity Diagram is divided in lanes according to the object in charge of the
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execution of the tasks, except for the rightmost lane that represents the Management
Server. Interactions between the client and the Management Server are performed by
means of messages exchange through the network.
In the beginning the presence of an up-to-date list of measurements to be performed
is checked, and if missing it is asked to the Management Server. Each measurement in
the list instantiates one object of class measurement, that will be in charge of the actual
execution of the experiment, that is defined by a bash script. In this phase experiment-
specific dynamic parameters can be requested to the Management Server, completing the
setup. Before the start of measurements, the presence of connectivity to the Internet is
checked: if the test fails then the execution of experiments is postponed for a given time
(5 minutes), then the cycle is restarted, skipping the request of the list of measurement
to the Management Server. If the connection check passes, the measurements are started
and optionally repeated according to the order and the repetition frequency specified in
the measurement list. For each measurement an expected duration is specified in the
experiment parameters: this sets a countdown from the beginning of the experiment that
on expiration causes an abrupt termination of the measurement. This is motivated by
the exceptional nature of a duration exceeding the expected time that is a symptom of a
malfunction and can impair the execution of the other measurements and ultimately the
functionality of the application. The causes for an abrupt interruption of a measurement
are:
• an error occurred during the experiment script execution
• the timeout for the specific measurement has expired
• the user has requested the interruption from the GUI interface
If the experiment terminates successfully, a report file is uploaded to the Management
Server. If an error occurred during the execution of the experiment, a debug report is
uploaded instead.
4.2.4 Target collection
Internet Censorship detection requires the fundamental process of collecting sets of po-
tential targets to be checked. These sets are needed both when applying active censorship
detection techniques, and when applying passive ones: in the first case the target set has
to be converted in suitable triggers (URLs, domains, IPs or keywords) that are likely to
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elicit censorship reaction, in the second case the set will limit the scope of data collection
to make the scraping, processing and storage tractable.
Targets of censorship can be grouped, from a user’s viewpoint, in two broad categories:
resources and services. A resource is a content available on the web (a text, an image,
or other kinds of documents) and is well represented by an URL. A service is a network
application, including -but not limited to- web applications.
Services
A service (or network application) can be characterized by the application protocol it
adopts and by the end points of the communication (the servers); this means that the
censor has multiple possibilities to impair an application, i.e. there are many different
triggers for the censor to exploit.
Testing the censorship of a service is equivalent, in the UBICA model, to test the
reachability of the list of host servers associated with the application (as test targets using
the related potential triggers. This equivalence is built in three phases of the UBICA
processing cycle: scheduling of experiments, censorship analysis and evidence reporting.
The tests will be scheduled to be run in a single experiment, in order to have a snapshot
measurement for the application.
The detection of censorship for targets of type service is performed in two stages:
1. the same algorithms used for resource censorship detection are applied on a sub-
set of the available tests, selected by choosing the specific service in the many-to-
many relationship service-test ; the outcome of this phase is a list of tuples (re-
source, test, confidence %);
2. a weighted average is taken of the list of tuples aggregated by test, producing a
single output value (service, verdict);
Automatic collection
The collection of targets is performed periodically by the management server. A list of
sources is part of the Knowledge Base, each entry presenting the fields:
• last check timestamp
• check interval
• retrieval method
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where the timestamp and the interval are controlled and if enough time has passed
since last check a new retrieval is done.
The retrieval method is a pointer to a script that is in charge of downloading, parsing
and inserting in the database the updated targets. It can be as simple as an URL pointing
to an API, when the source of the target lists provides one, or a web scraping script that
parses the HTML in order to extract URLs.
Examples of sources periodically checked by the UBICA platform for targets collection
are [Herdict], The Great Fireall of China, as well directories of open Web Proxies.
Future development can include automatic keyword collection mechanism such as the
one presented in [Crandall et al., 2007], or list of URLs from search engines and Social
Networks such as [Sfakianakis et al., 2011].
4.3 Target and Scheduling update
A target (e.g. of the type resource, identified by an URL) is associated with many entities
(e.g. multiple IP addresses of the webserver) and multiple triggers: destination socket,
protocol information, payload strings. Its essential characteristic, though, is its potential
of being censored in some country, with some technique. This nature is best captured by
the cycle of life of a target in the UBICA platform, that is represented as a Finite State
Machine in Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.10: Cycle of life of a target - Finite State Machine
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The states that describe a target are:
new the target is known to the platform, but has never been tested
past,incomplete the target has been tested in the past, but not enough information was
collected to issue a verdict (assumed uncensored)
past,uncensored the target has been tested in the past, and found not censored
past,censored the target has been tested in the past, and found censored
current,incomplete the target is being tested in the current measurement interval, and
not enough information has been collected yet to issue a verdict
current,completed the target is being tested in the current measurement interval, and
enough information has been collected to evaluate it
historical the target is not available for scheduling anymore
4.3.1 Scheduling of evidence collection
The centralized control paradigm adopted in the UBICA platform allows to coordinate
measurements across the available probes.
A probe notifies its availability to perform measurements by contacting periodically
the Management Server, asking for a list of tasks to perform. The Management Server,
according to the viewpoint of the contacting probe (the network the probe connects from)
selects a list of targets that still haven’t completed a number of measurements from the
given viewpoint (thus being in state incomplete, Figure 4.10). If no targets are in the
incomplete state, a random selection of targets that in the previous analysis interval were
classified as censored from the given viewpoint are chosen.
4.3.2 Evidence collection
The collection of evidence of censorship is performed through active measurements from
the probes, i.e. as a consequence of a scheduled experiment, a probe generates network
traffic towards the target hosts purposefully for triggering possible censorship, and records
the response it receives. The kind of traffic that is generated is flexible thanks to the
architecture design: it can be both the result of execution of standard implementation
of network utilities, such as nslookup, netcat, curl, traceroute, or -if necessary- an
ad-hoc binary can be deployed.
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For each experiment execution a given number of target hosts are considered, depend-
ing also on the client type.The total experiment duration is enforced by a timeout that
terminates all running measurements. This has been devised as a safeguard against mea-
surements that fail to return either with a result or with an error, and can possibly remain
running wasting memory and CPU resources. The measurement from each probe towards
the different target hosts are started at different times, uniformly distributed in an in-
terval of 40 seconds, across a total experiment duration of 220 seconds. These values
have been chosen heuristically to reduce the total probing time (thus affecting the less
is possible the user experience) and still allowing for a fair number of target hosts to be
checked.
The different types of measurements that have been performed are listed in the fol-
lowing.
DNS resolution
Happening first in the communication reference model as presented in 2.2.1, DNS reso-
lution affects the remaining phases thus has specific importance and informative power.
To collect clues about this phase a name resolution is elicited: given a Fully Qualified
Domain Name, a DNS request of type A is issued from the probe towards its default re-
solver. The tool used to issue the request is nslookup (from the bind-utils package for
the Linux-based platforms, and the default implementation on Windows systems 4). A
typical response is printed in Fig. 4.11: it can be noted that it reports the IP address of
the server replying the query, as well as a list of name resolutions.
Server: 130.194.1.99
Address: 130.194.1.99#53
Non-authoritative answer:
Name: 2photo.ru
Address: 217.65.3.83
Name: 2photo.ru
Address: 217.65.3.84
Name: 2photo.ru
Address: 217.65.3.85
Name: 2photo.ru
Address: 217.65.3.82
Figure 4.11: Example of nslookup output.
4we decide to use default implementations where available in order to emulate more closely the expe-
rience an user of the system would have.
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DNS service provider Resolver IP address
Google 8.8.8.8
Comodo 8.26.56.26
OpenDNS 208.67.222.222
Level3 209.244.0.3
Norton 198.153.192.40
Table 4.2: Open DNS resolvers used as control in UBICA .
An example of error output that can be reported while performing this test can be
seen in Figure 4.12.
Server: 127.0.0.1
Address: 127.0.0.1#53
** server can’t find 18starjp.blogtan.net: SERVFAIL
Figure 4.12: Example of nslookup output in case of errors.
Possible outcomes from this test are:
NOERROR : no error conditions have been detected [Mockapetris, 1987a]
SERVFAIL : “server failure” - the name server was unable to process the query [Mockapetris,
1987a]
NXDOMAIN : “no such domain” - the domain name referenced in the query does not
exist [Mockapetris, 1987a]
NOANSWER : the server replied, but provided no answer for the requested query (that
in the tests is of type A)
TIMEOUT : the server did not reply before the timeout (1 minute)
This kind of evidence is the basis for the detection of DNS tampering techniques
described in Section 2.3.2.
In order to distinguish among different DNS tampering techniques, the same request
is issued from the probe also towards a list of open resolvers, used as control resolvers
from inside the censored network. The list of open resolvers is the same as used in [Nabi,
2013] and is reported in Table 4.2.
TCP reachability
In order to check for filtering triggered by IP:port this phase of the test tries to establish
a TCP connection starting a three-way handshake, with a given timeout. The tests takes
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as parameters a socket targetIP:port and a timeout value in seconds, that has been set
by default to 15. The choice of this default value is motivated by the consideration that
times of the order of tenths of seconds only for the establishment of the connection make
it practically unusable, even though network equipment can tolerate higher delays 5.
In the case the target server is reachable and the considered port has a process listening
on it, a full establishment and teardown of a connection is performed: a total of 6 TCP
packets carrying no payload are exchanged between the probe and the destination as per
Fig.4.13.
Probe Target
[SYN]
[SYN,ACK]
[ACK]
[FIN,ACK]
[FIN,ACK]
[ACK]
Figure 4.13: TCP connection test - Sequence Diagram of the full three-way handshake and teardown.
Possible outcomes from this test are:
Open : the probe completed the connection establishment;
RST : a packet with RESET flag has been received;
Timeout : no answer has been received before the timeout expired;
Network error : network unreachable or destination unreachable;
The scenarios that explain the failure cases are shown in Fig. 4.14. We notice than
the fact that the case of out-of-band censorship devices forging RST packets to disrupt
the connection (Fig.4.14b) could be detected with specific and non-trivial techniques (as
described in [Clayton et al., 2006, Khattak et al., 2013, Polverini and Pottenger, 2011])
and told from a legitimate unavailability of the service (Fig.4.14a), but this requires the
inspection of packet-level traces of the communication. The collection of such traces
requires administrator rights on the user’s system and poses high privacy and security
5e.g. cisco security appliance ASA 5500 waits a default 30s for a new TCP connec-
tion to be established (see http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/asa/asa82/configuration/guide/
conns connlimits.html).
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risks, as the application would have access to the whole traffic originated or received on
the system. To avoid these concerns and to ease the installation of the UBICA client to
the end users we made the design choice of not requiring administrator rights, limiting
the level at which network data can be read. As a consequence of this, in the presented
platform the analysis on RST packets that could tell a censor action from a legitimate
technical unavailability can not be performed, because the results of the TCP-connectivity
test is collected at application level, as it is provided through the Operating System API.
Therefore to tell legitimate unavailability and technical issues from active censorship we
rely on multi-point and long-term probing (space and time diversity).
As this test can be affected by network conditions, in the case the result is not Open
the test is repeated in a short time, until the maximum number of repetitions is reached
(set to 3 in the experiments). This way a single Open result will signal that a TCP
connection can be established, while to characterize the target service as unreachable at
TCP level it will be necessary to sum up three subsequent failures.
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Probe Target
[SYN]
[RST,ACK]
(a) Legitimate RST
Probe Firewall Target
[SYN]
[RST]
[RST]
[RST]
(b) Censorship RST
Probe Firewall Target
[SYN]
[SYN]
[SYN]
(c) Timeout
Figure 4.14: TCP connection test - Sequence Diagrams of failure cases: (a) the expected scenario causing
a RST; (b) the case of out-of-band censoring device; (c) the case of in-line filtering device (also common
firewall devices and personal firewalls).
HTTP reachability
This test has usually been performed after a TCP-connectivity test towards the IP address
and port of the webserver. The trigger used in this test is an HTTP GET request: the
response (of lack of it) from the server is collected, along with application level values.
Before the issue of the actual request, two parameters are set dynamically: the
User-Agent string and the IP address of the target server. The HTTP header field
User-Agent is chosen randomly in a list of the most common user agent strings, accord-
ing to Eckersley [2010] and similarly to what specified in [ooni-specs]; the list of used
strings is shown in Tab. 4.3. The main purpose of this is to blend the request among the
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Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1.7) Gecko/20091221 Firefox/3.5.7
Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; U; CPU iPhone OS 3 1 2 like Mac OS X; en-us) AppleWebKit/528.18[. . . ]
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2) Gecko/20100115 Firefox/3.6
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2) Gecko/20100115 Firefox/3.6
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2) Gecko/20100115 Firefox/3.6
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; de; rv:1.9.2) Gecko/20100115 Firefox/3.6
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; de; rv:1.9.2) Gecko/20100115 Firefox/3.6
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; de; rv:1.9.2) Gecko/20100115 Firefox/3.6
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1.7) Gecko/20091221 Firefox/3.5.7
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; de; rv:1.9.1.7) Gecko/20091221 Firefox/3.5.7[. . . ]
Table 4.3: List of User-Agent strings used in the HTTP reachability test. Sources: [ooni-specs],
[Eckersley, 2010].
ones issued by common users: a server that discriminates on the basis of the User-Agent
field would affect a significant part of the western user base. For the specification of the
IP address of the target server two different criteria are used: (i) when testing the reach-
ability of a resource at a given - trusted - server, the IP address is directly specified in
the input data, bypassing DNS resolution to avoid DNS tampering; (ii) when deepening
the collection of evidence of DNS tampering, the IP address is taken from a DNS resolu-
tion performed locally from the probe towards its default resolver. This allows to use the
same code for both purposes, varying just the data that is provided in input to the test.
The behavior in case of HTTP Redirection is set to following the Location header
field, i.e. a new GET request will be issued towards this other URL. This event is revealed
by both a counter of redirects and the list of HTTP headers related to the series of requests
and saved in the results report.
Other forms of automatic redirection are provided in HTML by means of a number of
mechanisms, including [Chellapilla and Maykov, 2007, W3C, 1999, WASC, 2011]:
• “refresh” meta tag specifying an URL
• framing (in a frameset)
• framing (in an i-frame)
• client-side scripting (e.g.) JavaScript [Hoehrmann, 2006]
We group all of these under the umbrella-term “HTML-based redirection” (as opposed to
HTTP-based one). In order to follow these kinds of redirects the processing of HTML code
(and possibly embedded scripting code) is necessary; such processing is not performed in
the HTTP reachability test, that processes only 30X HTTP redirects. This way the HTML
(and possible scripting) code is downloaded as resource content and reported for analysis.
According to our preliminary measurement campaigns, stopping content download at
this stage does allow to detect censorship actions that are triggered by hostname, server
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IP and path of the requested resource, and provide as reply to the browser request a
redirection in place of the requested content (see Section 2.3.7). In fact the returned
content is usually much smaller in size than the requested resource (see Section 3.1.4) and
consists in the code for the HTML redirection.
A possible limitation of this design choice is related to the possibility that the target
resource legitimately contains HTML-based redirection; moreover this mechanism has
consequences in the interpretation of the results by the user. A discussion of this case is
reported in Section 5.5.1.
In case of SSL connection (when the target URL presents the https protocol indica-
tion), the validation of the certificate is disabled, i.e. the connection will be established
even when it is not possible to validate the server certificate, or if the validation would fail.
This is done in order to get results even in case of certificate expirations, misconfigurations
and from a possibly malicious interlocutor (TLS tampering, see Section 2.3.8).
Other settings regard timing boundaries, that are enforced in order to limit the overall
evidence gathering time, as the reporting of the results to the management server is bound
to the termination (either natural or forced) of all the network tests. The establishment of
a TCP connection has a timeout of 15s (coherently with the TCP connection test). The
whole transfer is bound to finish 10s before the evidence gathering session timeout, in order
to give the application the chance to exit cleanly (with a timeout error) without being
forcibly terminated. The size of the downloaded resource is also bound to a maximum,
that in the experimental evaluation has been set to 5MB as a safeguard. The tool
used to issue the request and collect application level information is curl, a mature and
widespread command line tool for “getting or sending files using URL syntax” 6.
The report from this test will include the values listed in Table 4.4, mostly from the
curl interface.
Besides the aforementioned output values, a number of coarse grained outcomes are
possible, notably in case of absence of returned content. In such case, trying to fetch the
resource pointed by the URL has failed, for the following possible reasons:
• an HTTP error occurred (recorded in http code)
• a network error occurred (recorded in curl exit)
• maximum number of redirects reached (recorded in curl exit and num redirects)
• a timeout is reached (recorded in curl exit)
6http://curl.haxx.se
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Value Description
content type The Content-Type of the requested document, if there was any.
http code The HTTP code returned for the last request (a 30X will be followed, thus
usually will not appear).
num redirects Number of redirects that were followed in the request.
size download The total amount of bytes that were downloaded.
size header The total amount of bytes of the downloaded headers.
size request The total amount of bytes that were sent in the HTTP request.
size upload The total amount of bytes that were uploaded.
speed download The average download speed that curl measured for the complete download.
Bytes per second.
speed upload The average upload speed that curl measured for the complete upload. Bytes
per second.
time appconnect Seconds from the start until the SSL handshake to the remote host was com-
pleted.
time connect Seconds from the start until the TCP connect to the remote host (or proxy)
was completed.
time pretransfer Seconds from the start until the file transfer was just about to begin. This
includes all pre-transfer commands and negotiations that are specific to the
particular protocol(s) involved.
time redirect The time, in seconds, it took for all redirection steps include name lookup,
connect, pretransfer and transfer before the final transaction was started.
time redirect shows the complete execution time for multiple redirections.
time starttransfer Seconds from the start until the first byte was just about to be transferred.
This includes time pretransfer and also the time the server needed to calculate
the result.
time total Seconds for the whole operation to complete.
url effective The URL actually requested (the last of redirects)
useragent The string chosen as User-Agent HTTP field in the request.
hostIP The IP address of the server destination of the HTTP request.
curl exit The exit error code of the application.
content The data returned as content of the HTTP response.
headers The data returned as the header fields of the HTTP responses (appended, for
multiple exchanges in case of redirects).
Table 4.4: Output values from the HTTP test. Except last five, they are obtained by means of the curl
API and the descriptions are adapted from the application man page; last five are the result of the setup
phase before the actual GET request and data received in the responses.
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DNS Host GET string Description and rationale Censorship evidence
0 local from URL from URL normal request no content, blockpage, errorpage
1 trusted from URL from URL normal request toward a trusted IP
address
if censored: DNS-tampering
2 trusted from URL random request of a plausibly non-existent
resource on target hostname, to-
ward a trusted IP
if not HTTP 404 response, censor-
ship triggered by the hostname
3 trusted random from URL request of resource from plausi-
bly nonexistent domain, toward a
trusted IP
if not HTTP 404 response, censor-
ship triggered by the resource path
4 trusted random random request of resource from nonexis-
tent hostname, toward a trusted IP
if not HTTP 404 response, censor-
ship triggered by the IP address
and GET method
Table 4.5: HTTP test variations: by substituting specific parameters it is possible to infer the one(s)
that trigger the censorship.
These provide the evidence for censorship detection tests based on content analysis.
The control over IP address towards which the request is issued and on the header
fields of the request allows for a number of secondary tests that leverage the HTTP test
to deepen the analysis in case of censorship suspicion.
In order to infer the trigger that causes the censorship mechanism, in case of censored
content a sequence of purposely forged HTTP GET requests can be issued according to
Table 4.5.
Case 3, when the hostname is substituted with a random string, can generate two
legitimate (i.e. in absence of censorship) responses: an HTTP 404 error, or an HTTP 200
confirmation, and a resource in the body. The last is caused by the Virtual Host matching
algorithm 7 and can happen when:
there are no virtual hosts : the resource returned will be the same of case 1
the default virtual host is the original hostname : the resource returned will be
the same of case 1
the default virtual host has the same resource : the resource returned can be dif-
ferent from case 1
Ambiguity in this case can be dealt with by comparing the response with what happens
in case 1. If in case 1 the blocking resulted in no resource (and error X), and same for
case 3, the (same) censorship is still triggered while if a resource is returned only in 3
then the trigger was in the hostname and could be circumvented if no virtual hosting is
7Virtual Hosts are chosen by matching the server IP address (in case of multi-homed hosts) and then
on HTTP host field value, falling back to the default website on the IP if no hostname matches on it (e.g.
see http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/vhosts/details.html).
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running on the target webserver (by specifying the trusted IP and a wrong hostname).
If in case 1 the blocking resulted in a resource (blockpage, errorpage or mangled page),
then in case a resource is returned in 3, it must be compared with it: if matches, the
(same) censorship is still triggered, if it is different, then the trigger was in the hostname
and there is possibility of circumvention. Last possibility is when case 1 resulted in a
resource and case 3 in an HTTP 404 error: then clearly the blocking was triggered by the
hostname, but no circumvention is possible (as virtual hosting is active).
Drawbacks of this testing approach are that it causes errors of wrong pages requests in
the target servers (if the request reaches them) and it is fingerprintable. The first aspect
can be mitigated by choosing the suitable probing rates for the considered target. The
fingerprintability can be mitigated by using, in place of the random substitute strings for
resources, URLs that are at the same time: similar to the original ones, not containing the
same strings (that could trigger a pattern-based DPI), and known to be missing from the
target host, and thus potentially cause a revealing 404 error. As the concealing of probing
activity has been excluded from the stated goals for the platform, the implementation
of this enhancement has been not conducted for the prototype realization used in the
experimental validation.
SSL certificate check
Possibilities A way to detect this type of censorship can be based on the content analysis,
as it should lead to altered or no content provided that the invalid certificate is not
checked. To detect the specific censorship technique (and thus identify the level at which
the censor acted) a copy of the SSL certificate can be compared with the one provided by
a ground truth, supposedly from outside the censornet. It is worth noting that knowing
that this censorship technique is applied does not help much in circumventing it, because
even if the rogue certificate is detected (e.g. by adopting the certificate pinning practice),
the connection can not continue or is known to be tampered with: from this point of
view it could be an effective censorship technique. Nonetheless, even if the access to the
original content is prevented, a strong evidence of censorship is surfaced, revealing that
the proper communication standards and rules have been not respected, and the trust of
the user has been betrayed.
Previous research of MITM attacks by means of forged certificates can be found in
[Holz et al., 2011], where a survey of SSL adoption in 2010 and 2011 has been performed
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on the Alexa top 1M sites of the time, by actively probing from PlanetLab nodes the
HTTPS services on the hosts and analyzing the properties of the returned certificate.
The check for MITM attacks was indeed a secondary goal for the authors, that were
performing a broader analysis on the status of TLS/SSL adoption over time. They defined
as suspicious cases the ones that provided a different certificate while the certificates were
identical if retrieved from all but at most 2 other locations. The authors did actually find a
higher number of suspicious cases when probing from Beijing, Moscow and Shanghai, with
respect the other European or American probes locations, but did not conclude that they
were due to MITM attacks, blaming administrative difficulties, motivating that with the
consideration that Shanghai suspicious cases corresponded to domains not identifiable
as sensitive (neither political, nor religious, or circumvention or communication topics
were involved). From the point of view of censorship detection, main shortcomings of
the method adopted by the authors of [Holz et al., 2011] derive from the fact that they
(knowingly) rely on local DNS resolution and thus could be subject to both CDN-based
localization and to DNS tampering.
In the UBICA platform the evidence collection for this test is implemented by means
of the openssl tool 8, used to retrieve the certificate of the given server from the probe.
In order to differentiate the cases when DNS tampering is in action or not, and to
avoid false positives due to CDN and similar localization mechanisms, the IP address
of the server is specified explicitly, while the hostname is specified by means of the SNI
(Server Name Indication) extension [3rd, 2011] in case the host is serving multiple Virtual
Hosts. Thus the SSL check takes 2 input parameters (server IP address and hostname)
and outputs 4 values: the X.509 certificate in PEM format, a flag signaling whether a
ground truth IP address has been specified or a local DNS resolution has occurred, the
standard error of the SSL handshake (reporting possible errors and other metadata).
In [Winter, 2013] a test similar to the SSL check proposed in the UBICA architecture
is described, with the difference that DNS resolution is not controlled in performing the
test (it is not performed at all if a DNS tampering is preventively detected).
Traceroute
Traceroute [Jacobson, 1999] and its variants are active probing tools using network packets
forged with an increasing value of the Time-to-Live (TTL) field to solicit an ICMP Time
8https://www.openssl.org/
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Exceeded error message one hop at a time. Their use for censorship detection is described
in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.5.
The UBICA platform generally uses the traceroute tool provided with the Linux op-
erating system, that employs UDP packets and does not require administrator privileges.
If such privileges are available, the hping3 9 implementation of traceroute is employed, as
besides using TCP and ICMP protocols, it is capable to set arbitrary data in the payload
of the probe packets.
The traceroute measurement requires as mandatory input an IP address, and option-
ally (provided that administrator privileges are granted) a protocol, a port, and a data
payload; the typical output is reported in Figure 4.15.
HPING 143.225.229.169 (eth1 143.225.229.169): S set, 40 headers + 0 data bytes
hop=1 TTL 0 during transit from ip=192.168.0.1
hop=1 hoprtt=1.0 ms
hop=2 TTL 0 during transit from ip=213.205.16.53
hop=2 hoprtt=21.2 ms
hop=3 TTL 0 during transit from ip=94.32.137.129
hop=3 hoprtt=20.3 ms
hop=4 TTL 0 during transit from ip=213.205.17.181
hop=4 hoprtt=21.2 ms
hop=5 TTL 0 during transit from ip=94.32.135.137
hop=5 hoprtt=25.7 ms
hop=6 TTL 0 during transit from ip=193.201.29.15
hop=6 hoprtt=25.4 ms
hop=7 TTL 0 during transit from ip=90.147.80.58
hop=7 hoprtt=49.8 ms
hop=8 TTL 0 during transit from ip=90.147.80.166
hop=8 hoprtt=29.7 ms
hop=9 TTL 0 during transit from ip=90.147.80.150
hop=9 hoprtt=35.8 ms
hop=10 TTL 0 during transit from ip=193.206.130.10
hop=10 hoprtt=62.8 ms
hop=11 TTL 0 during transit from ip=143.225.190.145
hop=11 hoprtt=28.7 ms
hop=12 TTL 0 during transit from ip=143.225.190.97
hop=12 hoprtt=51.0 ms
len=46 ip=143.225.229.169 ttl=52 DF id=33934 sport=0 flags=RA seq=12 win=0 rtt=43.1 ms
--- 143.225.229.169 hping statistic ---
13 packets tramitted, 13 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 1.0/32.0/62.8 ms
Figure 4.15: Evidence collection - hping3 traceroute
4.4 Analysis Engine
The primary goal of the UBICA platform is to detect censorship, i.e. given a target
resource and a viewpoint (a country / ISP / network address range) tell if the resource is
9a command-line network diagnostic tool http://hping.org
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censored, with what kind of technique, and with what degree of confidence. Given a target
resource and a probing vantage point, for each analysis interval the ultimate outcome is
one of the following:
insufficient data : some data, but no enough to run the algorithm
not censored : verdict with a confidence index
censored : verdict with a confidence index
4.4.1 Evidence Data
In order to reach a verdict about the resource the results from clue collection are evaluated.
Such data is considered in analysis tasks dedicated to specific phases of the communication
model (Section 2.2.1 that create the intermediate data used for the censorship detection
algorithm. The output of each analysis task is available to the researcher through the
Management Interface, that constitutes an abstracted interface for both the access to the
raw data and the setup of the parameters of the analysis algorithm.
Data cleansing
One guiding principle in the platform design has been the base hypothesis that a resource
is not considered censored unless contrary evidence is available. Considering the detec-
tion algorithm as a binary classification process, this is equivalent to say that the null
hypothesis is that the resource is not censored, and the detection algorithm will preferen-
tially generate Type-II error (rejection of a real censorship occurrence) over Type-I ones
(false alarm).
Most of the considered measurements are end-to-end tests, that can fail for a number
of unintentional reasons (faults, misconfiguration, catastrophic events, massive malicious
activity). Research in Internet-scale outages such these [Jun and Brooks, 2011] has con-
sidered their effects as negligible after 48 hours. In order to account for such temporary
conditions, a tentative time span for analysis has a been set to 14 days: approximately
one order of magnitude longer as a cautionary measure, and chosen as a multiple of the
week to take into account possible anthropic patterns. Despite the long time averag-
ing interval, the temporal analysis algorithm is designed in order to have half-size scope:
specifically even if a 14 days long interval has been set, time variations with 1 week scope
are detected (see Section 4.4.3).
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DNS TCP HTTP
Outcome Error Failing IP Block IP Error IP Error RST Timeout No reply Undersize
Threshold 70% 70% 0% 70% 50% 70% 70% 70% 70%
Table 4.6: Data Cleansing: coherence thresholds
A minimum number of tests to be considered for said time span can be set (in the
experimental evaluation defaults to 10 tests over a 2 week timespan 10) so that multiple
samples for each experiment are available and the effect of occasional outages is averaged.
For each test outcome a minimum percentage threshold can be defined: if the relative
frequency of occurrence of the outcome does not surpass its threshold the outcome is not
considered for the analysis. These thresholds can be considered indicators of the coherence
of the outcome and are to be tuned according to the amount of false positives generated by
over-threshold results. For the experimental evaluation they have been set to the values
reported in Table 4.6. It is worth noting that the thresholds are set depending only
on the type of outcome and are valid for all the resources and for all the viewpoints. A
possible enhancement is to specify per-(viewpoint,test) threshold and evaluate its impact
on the false positive rate, that has been left for future research.
Another pre-processing task that is performed regards hostnames that result unreach-
able from all the ISPs worldwide. The unreachability can be either at the DNS level
(returning DNS errors or Error Pages) or at the TCP level (connection error) or at the
HTTP content level (no content). This is explained by the fact that during the monitor-
ing time some websites are decommissioned, and thus either (i) the hostname itself is no
more present in the DNS global database (expired domains) or (ii) no server is available
to reply or (iii) no content is provided. If the unreachability is at DNS level worldwide,
these hostnames and the resources that are hosted at them are signaled for manual in-
spection: the operator can then mark them as dismissed (see Figure 4.10) and have them
excluded from the censorship analysis and future scheduling of tests.
It is worth noting that server-side censorship, i.e. censorship applied either by the
content manager, or the service host, could generate such a result: the UBICA platform
in the presented design does not try to detect this kind of censorship and its verdict,
coherently with the cautionary principle, is of not reporting the case as censorship.
10this is a tentative value that heuristically has yield no false positives in the experimental evaluation; it
is consistent with -and more cautionary than- a similar threshold of 3 samples per week used in [Gill et al.,
2013].
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4.4.2 Detection Algorithms
The detection algorithms that are employed in the UBICA platform integrate different
kinds of information, coming from:
• the specific experiment (viewpoint,target) under evaluation
• other experiments with the same target but different viewpoints (in the same ISP,
in the same country, globally)
• the knowledge base (knowledge from external sources or provided by manual inspec-
tion)
The detection algorithm takes as input a triplet (viewpoint,target,timespan) and outputs
a verdict comprising:
• statistics of the censorship index (minimum, average, maximum)
• the list of censorship techniques detected
The censorship index is a summarizing value that accounts for the number of different
censorship techniques that have been detected and the percentage of times they have been
detected. It is meant to serve as an overall index of the technical effort that a censor has
put into preventing the access to that target and the effectiveness of these efforts.
The list of censorship techniques is built by analyzing the outcomes of the measures
as described in the following.
Pre-processing of DNS measures
The results of DNS measures (see Section 4.3.2 for details) consist in the response to a
query of type A that is issued towards either the user’s default DNS resolver, or to a group
of open resolvers (used as control). For both kinds the analysis steps are the same.
The answer of the query is classified as:
DNSerror : the query resulted in an error, no IP address was returned
Failing IP : the returned IP address belongs to a list of known addresses that will cause
a TCP connection error; this list comprises non-publicly-routable addresses such as
private addresses;
Error Page : the returned IP address hosts a webserver that invariably serves a page
telling that the requested hostname is not existent;
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Block Page : the returned IP address hosts a webserver that invariably serves a page
telling that the requested hostname has been deliberately blocked, possibly reporting
the reason and the law under which this has been done.
Plausible DNS result : if none of the previous ones verified, i.e. an IP address has
been returned and it is not present in any of the known lists.
For each class the percentage is taken on the specified time span, this percentage will
be compared with the coherence threshold described in Section 4.4.1 to decide whether
the results will be considered for the final censorship verdict. This is done because almost
all the outcomes could be returned in case of technical issues or outages, and thus some
tolerance for faults has been factored in the design. A notable exception is for the case of
Block Page class, for which the censorship is explicitly stated and is not associated with
outage scenarios; therefore a threshold of 0% has been chosen for it.
The described summarizing pre-processing constitutes the DNS Analysis View (and is
implemented as a materialized view in the database).
Pre-processing of TCP measures
The analysis of the TCP measures is straightforward (see Section 4.3.2 for the collection
of base data), and consists in grouping the outcomes in broader classes:
RST : three subsequent connection tries have been shut down with RESET packets;
Timeout : three subsequent connection tries have timed out;
Error : other network errors have occurred;
Reachable : a TCP connection has been correctly established (complementary to the
other cases);
The described summarizing pre-processing constitutes the TCP Analysis View (and
is implemented as a materialized view in the database).
Pre-processing of HTTP measures
The results of HTTP reachability measurements (Section 4.3.2) are analyzed to infer
information about content. Given a time interval and a target, the summaries and the
percentage of occurrences of the following events are computed:
• a content has been downloaded (percentage);
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• median of the downloaded content (in bytes) - samples with no downloaded content
are ignored;
• couple (HTTP redirect count, percentage);
• couple (HTTP response code value, percentage) - in case of HTTP redirect this
refers to last retrieved resource;
• couple (application-level error code, occurrence).
The described summarizing pre-processing constitutes the Content Analysis View (and is
implemented as a materialized view in the database).
Censorship verdict
Given a time interval and a viewpoint, for each target a verdict is obtained on whether
it is censored or not, and if it is, with which techniques. The viewpoint represents the
network hosting the probe, and can be set to different aggregation levels, such as address
range, ISP, Country ; results collected from one viewpoint are compared with “the rest
of the world”, i.e. the complement to the viewpoint of the set of all measures; in the
following for easy of exposition and coherence with the displayed results the aggregation
level ISP has been considered.
The algorithm is a cascade of three steps, with results from one step used in the subse-
quent one. For each technique that has been appended to the list of detected techniques
the related percentage of occurrence is summed to a temporary counter that will be used
to calculate the overall confidence index.
The first step is the evaluation of DNS tampering. Only results crossing the coherence
threshold are considered (4.4.1), and every condition of the form isDNSblockIP(D) is a
shorthand for “the percentage resulting from pre-processing of DNSblockIP outcome for
Default resolver has crossed its specific coherence threshold”; analogous meaning has the
condition isDNSblockIP(C), but referred to C ontrol resolvers; and the expressions ending
in “ xavg” mean that the percentage is the result of an average on all ISPs but the
one under analysis, thus isDNSerr(C) xavg means that the average of Control resolvers
calculated on the complement to current ISP has crossed the threshold for DNS error .
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if isDNSblockPage(D) then
if isDNSblockPage(C)
then append_to_techniques ( DNSblockPage_injection )
else append_to_techniques ( DNSblockPage_hijacking )
if isDNSfailIP(D) then
if isDNSfailIP(C)
then append_to_techniques ( DNSfailIP_injection )
else append_to_techniques ( DNSfailIP_hijacking )
if isDNSerrorPage(D) then
if isDNSerrorPage(C)
then append_to_techniques ( DNSerrorPage_injection )
else append_to_techniques ( DNSerrorPage_hijacking )
if isDNSerror(D) then
if isDNSerror(C)
then
if ( not isDNSerror(D)_xavg ) and ( not isDNSerror(C)_xavg )
then append_to_techniques ( DNSerror_injection )
else
if ( not isDNSerror(D)_xavg )
then append_to_techniques ( DNSerror_hijacking )
Figure 4.16: Censorship verdict algorithm - step 1 (DNS analysis)
The second step is the detection of packet filtering and TCP connection disruption
(Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4). As the TCP measurement is performed towards the IP address
returned by the default DNS resolver, whenever a DNS response of type failing IP is
returned then the TCP connection is meant to fail: this should not be accounted as due
to TCP-level tampering, thus a correction is made on the percentages on which apply the
technique-specific threshold.
Given the following definitions
• F the total number of failures at TCP level
• D the count of DNS failing IP occurrences
• C the count of TCP failures not due to DNS failing IP
• th the threshold for TCP failures
• T the total number of tests
• R the number of TCP tests not preceded by DNS failing IP
the threshold crossing that would have been verified as
F
T
> th
is instead evaluated as
C = F −D
Analysis Engine 89
R = T −D
C
R
> th ⇒ C > th · T − th ·D
Besides the threshold adaptation and percentages computed on a reduced number of
tests, the different outcomes are evaluated similarly to the previous step, possibly adding
new detected symptoms : TCP-Timeout, TCP-RST, TCP-errors, and summing their relative
occurrences (calculated with respect to the reduced number of tests) in the confidence
counter.
The third step regards the detection of HTTP tampering techniques (Section 4.3.2). It
is composed of two parts: the evaluation of cases when no content was retrieved, leading
to HTTP-noContent, and when a content has been retrieved but its size is smaller than a
give threshold compared with the average of the size computed on all ISPs but the one
under analysis, leading to a condition of HTTP-undersize.
As for the case of TCP, the threshold for HTTP-noContent has to be adapted account-
ing for the failures due to both DNS-failingIP and TCP errors.
The final verdict returns the list of detected techniques, each with the related per-
centage of occurrence, and a confidence index, calculated as the sum of all the (scaled)
percentages and normalized to 0.99.
4.4.3 Time Analysis
Censorship is a dynamic phenomenon, as targets and censorship techniques vary in time.
A censorship monitoring platform must explicitly address this characteristic in order to
be able to both reliably detect censorship and signal when a change has occurred. The
UBICA platform satisfies these requirements by performing censorship detection tests
on given time intervals. A “jumping window” scheme is used to partition the available
reports in a series of consecutive evenly-sized intervals.
To take into account possible border effects, a second series of contiguous time inter-
vals is considered, having the same duration of the first one but displaced by half length.
This way each interval of one series is centered on the border between two consecutive
intervals of the other series. As a consequence the granularity of time analysis is of one
half-interval, but employs results gathered on a full interval span. The interval duration
for the experiments has been set to a default of two weeks, as a compromise between a
small granularity and the size of analysis data that has to be stored. Considering a se-
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Overlapping Disjoint
outcomes verdict
A C B D1D2D3D4 Description
000 0000 same as if considering only A and B
001 0001 delays detection by one half interval
011 0011 same as if considering only A and B
111 1111 same as if considering only A and B
110 1100 same as if considering only A and B
100 1000 anticipates end of censorship by one half interval
010 0110 signals censorship in the middle
(undetected in disjoint intervals)
101 1001 signals absence of censorship in the middle
(undetected in disjoint intervals)
Table 4.7: Time analysis: response using overlapping time intervals - Three full-length intervals (two
disjoint A,B plus the overlapping one C in the center) exhibit presence (1) or absence (0) of censorship
evidence; this is translated in four verdicts on the disjoint half-length intervals D1, D2, D3, D4.
quence of two disjoint intervals A and B each divided in two half intervals (A1,A2,B1,B2)
and one interval C that overlaps A2 for its first half and B1 for its second half, the al-
gorithm maps the censorship analysis results of the sequence f(A,C,B) onto the sequence
D1,D2,D3,D4. The association between the possible combinations of censorship responses
over two subsequent intervals and the central overlapping one is shown in Table 4.7 with
the corresponding interpretation given by the algorithm. The primary criterion is conser-
vative: for the half intervals with overlapping the verdict is for censorship if both A and
C gave censorship (respectively C and B). This delays the detection of censorship or an-
ticipates the end of detected censorship with respect to the dates obtained by considering
only A and B. Another effect of the proposed mapping is to highlight variations in censor-
ship (or its absence) that would go undetected considering only A and B. Time analysis
applies iteratively this algorithm to subsequent triplets of overlapping intervals, so that
the verdict on each half interval is always evaluated on the results from two overlapping
full intervals.
4.5 Report Interface
The ultimate aim of the platform activity, the censorship detection results, are presented
to the users in the form of graphical reports, provided by means of a dedicated interface.
The Report interface is implemented as a web application, employing as a back-end the
Apache webserver connected with a relational database (Postgres), and as a front end a
JavaScript-enabled web client. This choice allowed to leverage the availability of mature
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open-source software and high-level client-side graphic libraries 11 , as well as limiting to
the minimum the necessity of installing external software in order to access the platform
report functionalities.
Two main views of the data are presented, a “Global” view and an “User-centric”
view, depending on the network address of the user: if the request to the report interfaces
comes from a network that hosted an UBICA probe, then the “User-centric” view is
chosen, otherwise the generic “Global view” is shown. This is performed by matching the
client IP address with the address ranges associated with the UBICA probes.
4.5.1 Global View
The Global view presents the analysis results regarding all the countries from which
enough data has been provided to perform a censorship analysis. Aggregated results are
shown in form of graphs and refer to the last month of analysis; the couple from,to of
input fields allows to specify another time interval. The view is divided in three areas:
a world map (on top), a bar-chart area (in the middle) and a time-series graph at the
bottom.
The world map At the top of the report view a map of the globe is shown, with
the world countries boundaries (Figure 4.17). Each country is either colored gray (if no
enough data is available for a censorship analysis from that country) or is colored with
a shade of red with increased intensity the higher the evidence of censorship is detected.
With a mouse click on the area of a country a view is shown of results that are specific
to the chosen country. This view is similar in aspect to the User-centric view, to which
we refer for further details.
11For the graphical rendering of report data the JavaScript library highcharts (http://highcharts.com)
has been employed.
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Figure 4.17: UBICA Interface, Global View Reports - top of page: world map with evidence of censorship
(gray countries lack enough data for an analysis; red countries have data, the darker the color the more
evidence of censorship is available. Different countries are not to be compared, as the number of tests
and targets usually differ.
The bar charts The center of the view (Figure 4.18 is occupied by three bar-charts
showing (clockwise from top left): top tested countries, top 100 tested URLs, top 100
failing URLs. Each item of the chart has two bars associated: “reachable” (in green)
and “unreachable” (in light red) that represent the number of access tests that resulted
in a success or in a failure (hint for possible blocking). In order to compare items that
have been tested a different number of times, a version of the same data expressed in
percentage of the number of tests per item is provided (Figure 4.19). By hovering with
the mouse pointer over one item’s bar the data values (full item name, reachability coun-
t/percentage and unreachability count/percentage) are shown; by clicking on it a pop-up
window is presented, showing the detailed summaries of test results for the specific item
(Figure 4.20). All the charts have a sliding bar that allows to scan over a range of items
beyond the first displayed.
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Figure 4.18: UBICA Interface, Global View Reports - middle graphs: bar charts of top tested countries,
top tested URLs and top failing URLs (clockwise, from top left). Results are the number of tests for the
specific item.
Figure 4.19: UBICA Interface, Global View Reports - middle graphs: bar charts of top tested countries,
top tested URLs and top failing URLs (clockwise, from top left). Results are in percentage over the total
number of tests for the specific item.
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Figure 4.20: UBICA Interface, Global View Reports - clicking on a bar-chart item a pop-up window with
the details of the specific item appears
The time-series chart The time-series chart at the bottom of the view shows the
aggregate results of tests over time (Figure 4.21). Hovering the mouse pointer on the
graph shows the timestamp and the results available for that time. Below the time chart
two controls allow to set the time interval to be shown in detail.
Figure 4.21: UBICA Interface, Global View Reports - bottom: time series graph of reachability tests
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4.5.2 User-centric View
The User-centric view shows the analysis results regarding the specific network from
which the client is querying the Reports Interface (as detected by the server). This is
possible if the network (intended as a range of IP addresses advertised on public databases
as WHOIS as belonging to a given ISP) has hosted an UBICA probe that uploaded a
minimum number of reports 12 to the management server. This view is similar to the
global view, as it shows a time series graph, and two bar charts showing the top 100
failing URLs (bottom left) and top 100 tested URLs (bottom right); moreover in the top
left part a pie chart shows the overall percentage of reachability. All data refers to the
specific network and the considered time span defaults to the last month for which data
is available. A from,to couple of input fields allows the specification of the desired time
range. All the graphs are a specialization of the ones available in the Global view, thus
provide the same functionalities (sliding bars to scan the top 100 items, numeric values
for an item when the mouse hovers on its bar, and item-specific details when the bar is
clicked).
The same graphs are shown for data aggregated at country level when a tested country
is clicked in the Global view.
12set by default, and in the analysis here described, to the value 10.
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Figure 4.22: UBICA Interface, User-based Reports
4.5.3 Analysis dashboard
The Analysis Interface has been designed to allow manual inspection of the results, high-
lighting conditions that can potentially lead to clues of censorship and of the techniques
possibly adopted to enforce it.
In a preliminary phase, the Analysis Interface has been adopted to check the data and
help define the censorship detection algorithms. In the following sections we will show
selected examples from this use case.
The TCP analysis report
In order to collect targets for the detection of Transport-level censorship techniques the
following algorithm is proposed:
1. select URLs whose DNS results suggest blocking (everything besides plausible IP
addresses), and no TCP reachability issues
2. compare the returned IP address against the ones returned from probes in other
countries / ISPs (different ISPs may have different censorship-enforcing boxes IPs,
but also redirect to the same country-wide IP as for BlockPage cases).
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3. non-matching addresses will be added for TCP-connectivity test; these tests will be
marked as “driven by DNS-tampering-suspicion” as opposed to the ones deriving
from DNS resolution from the default resolver;
The expected result is that by comparing, for a given resource (URL) the results of TCP
reachability for default-DNS set, control-DNS set and foreign-DNS set it should become
evident if there is TCP-level blocking applying the following criteria:
• if all the three sets have comparable percentages of TCP reachability (differenced
less than a given tunable threshold) then we assume no TCP-level censorship
• if the foreign set shows a smaller percentage of TCP reachability (differenced more
than said threshold) compared with the default DNS set then we consider it a po-
tential evidence of TCP-level censorship, triggered by the IP:port sockets belonging
to the foreign set; moreover this validates the evidence of DNS-based censorship
and can suggest new IP addresses of type BlockPage or ErrorPage.
• the same criterion is applied to the control set if it does not match with the foreign
set.
Inference of the used censorship techniques
The report on both Content-related tests and DNS-related ones is shown in Figure 4.23:
data is aggregated per target URL, and geolocation data (Country and ISP, as derived
from IP address) of the probe that performed the measurements; shown data are:
Tests : the total number of tests performed (i.e. the total number of reports uploaded
to the platform);
NULL content % : the percentage of webcontent tests that resulted in no content;
Content length : the 50% percentile of content length as reported in webcontent tests;
DNS Plausible % - D : the percentage of DNSresolution tests towards the probes de-
fault resolver that resulted in responses not suggesting any tampering;
DNS Plausible % - C : the percentage of DNSresolution tests towards Control re-
solvers that resulted in responses not suggesting any tampering.
From the comparison of content length field across different rows it becomes evident
that in Pakistan one provider (namely, National WiMAX/IMS environment) blocks the
access to shown URL, as no content has ever been downloaded in 74% of 27 tests, while
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for other countries / ISPs this happened in percentages ranging from 0 (Italy) to 6 (Pak-
istan, other ISP). Moreover it can be seen that the DNS test was not able to detect any
tampering, so either the censorship techniques for this URL does not involve DNS tam-
pering, or the DNS tampering detection algorithm was not able to detect it. In the first
case, taking the DNS results at face value, we can motivate it by noting that the ISP
name suggests that the connection to the Internet is provided by means of WiMAX tech-
nologies, that are known to employ Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEP) middleboxes:
these could constitute an almost cost-free censoring device allowing the provider to en-
force URL-triggered DPI-based censorship. If we instead suppose that DNS tampering
detection has failed, a DNS poisoning / injection could be enacted providing a resulting
IP that is of type “Failing IP” (as the “ErrorPage” and “BlockPage” IP provide HTTP
content).
Manual inspection of these cases can also lead to validation or improvement of the
DNS tampering detection algorithm, e.g. by allowing the discovery of a new IP of type
“Failing IP” that could be used to block the access to the target URL: this procedure will
enable tracking of the IP addresses involved in DNS tampering, updating the censorship
tests as the actual implementations of censorship change over time.
4.6 Known Issues and Limits
The design principles that have been chosen, while presenting the desired properties of
control that allow for a flexible management of the probes and of the experiments, have
some intrinsic drawbacks. These are rooted mainly in the centralized nature of the de-
ployment, embodied in the Management Server, and in the crowdsourced nature of the
data processed by the system. The centralized nature of the adopted deployment makes
it more prone to detection and blocking by the censors. The phases of experiment update
and input parameters download, as well the upload of the result reports to the server, can
be tampered with or altogether impeded. Possible strategies for mitigation of detection
and blocking are:
• encrypt communications between clients and management server
• distribute the server interface on a general purpose cloud (to avoid trivial IP-based
blocking)
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• adopt address distribution services for the management server address analogous to
the ones adopted by the Tor network (email, mirrored index servers)
• adopt indirect channels to upload or by other means publish the result reports
(e.g. using delay-tolerant anonymous communications such as i2p [Timpanaro et al.,
2012].
The other intrinsic limitation is the crowdsourced origin of the analyzed information:
the data are provided by anonymous users that are considered as trusted, in the sense
that there is no direct validation of provided data, nor authentication and identification
are adopted, for privacy reasons (thus a reputations system is not a viable solution).
As for other projects that rely on information that can not be validated, or provided by
anonymous users that can not be held responsible for supplied data, a form of mitigation
is based on statistical analysis: the more users support the same data, the more these
are considered reliable. This is implemented in the UBICA platform by weighting the
“confidence” value by the percentage of reports supporting the final decision.
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Figure 4.23: Analysis Interface: summarized results of Content and DNS tests are aggregated by target URL and probe Country and ISP;
shown data are: the number of tests successfully reported, 50% percentile of web content length, and percentage of supposedly not tampered
DNS resolutions for both probe default (D) and control (C) resolvers. It can be noted how in Pakistan one provider (National WiMAX/IMS
environment) blocks the access to shown URL (by comparing with other countries/providers content length), and also infer that blocking is not
done at DNS level.
Chapter 5
Experimental Validation
The platform described in the previous chapter has been implemented in a prototype
presenting all the functional features as designed. A subset of the designed evidence
collection tests have been implemented, namely: DNS resolution, TCP reachability and
HTTP reachability.
The management server, hosting also the UBICA portal with public interfaces has
been configured in the laboratory of Networked System at Department of Electric and
Information Technologies Engineering at University of Napoli “Federico II”, with public
IP address in the GARR ( Italian Academic and Research telecommunication network).
A repository server and a backup server within the same premises have been set up.
With the help of professional and personal contacts a limited number of software probes
have been deployed in different countries worldwide, plus more than a dozen BISMark
routers [Sundaresan et al., 2012] for an experimental deployment in Pakistan and two
control routers, one in Italy and another in U.S.A.; the distributed experiments platform
PlanetLab [Chun et al., 2003] has also been employed, deploying UBICA probes in the
most diverse set of countries available at the time of the experiments.
The measurement campaigns have leveraged a different sets of UBICA probes (due
to some churning in availability of the platforms and in user participation), summing up
to more than 200 probes at different times, constituted by: 47 clients with GUI (run by
volunteers both in Italy and abroad); 188 headless clients (of which 19 run by volunteers
worldwide and 169 in PlanetLab nodes) and 16 BISMark home routers run by volunteers
(mostly in Pakistan). Measurements have been made from 31 different countries, testing
more than 16K different targets (about 15K different hostnames) on a timespan of 4
months (during multiple shorter measurement campaigns).
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5.1 Global experimental campaigns
5.1.1 Country-wise HTTP reachability
A preliminary test of the platform functionality has been performed using the HTTP
reachability collection test, while analysis has been performed directly on the raw data,
verifying the HTTP return code (200 OK) and the actual download of content. The SQL
code used to extract the data is reported in Figure 5.1.
Postprocessing of HTTP reachability data with this simple algorithm constitutes a
detection technique comparable with the [Herdict] method.
The targets to be tested have been taken from the [Herdict] website (the most recent
600 URLs reported as unreachable) by leveraging the exposed API to query the database
of reports.
In a measurement campaign started on July 16th, 2013, 22:25 UTC and spanning
almost 3.5 hours over 118 globally distributed PlanetLab nodes we have collected the
results of the above mentioned content reachability test: results are shown in Table 5.1.
By observing the reachability percentages, plotted in Figure 5.2, we can notice a spike
of lack of content in requests issued from within China (CN, 70.5%). Only another country
shows unreachability level greater than 50%: Bangladesh (BD, 69.1%). In this case the
combination of having a single probe (see Table 5.1) with a limited time span for the
detection does not allow to infer if a temporary connectivity issue for the probe is the
cause.
The experiments have verified the main functionalities of the platform, specifically:
• the collection of targets ;
• the controlled distribution of sublists of targets to the probes as they query the
management server;
• the execution of the measurement tests from the probes;
• the reporting of measurement test results to the Repository Server
• the processing of the aggregated result data.
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probeCC probes tests reach unreach reach% unreach%
US 69 69875 52579 17296 75.2 24.8
CN 10 11697 3446 8251 29.5 70.5
JP 6 6044 4396 1648 72.7 27.3
NZ 6 6569 3533 3036 53.8 46.2
CA 3 3032 2478 554 81.7 18.3
RU 3 3035 2043 992 67.3 32.7
UY 3 3091 2129 962 68.9 31.1
XX 3 3056 2340 716 76.6 23.4
BR 2 3025 2375 650 78.5 21.5
GB 2 2076 1455 621 70.1 29.9
HK 2 1351 1126 225 83.3 16.7
AR 1 1006 738 268 73.4 26.6
AU 1 1014 780 234 76.9 23.1
BD 1 1156 357 799 30.9 69.1
CZ 1 985 829 156 84.2 15.8
EC 1 678 565 113 83.3 16.7
IN 1 1011 837 174 82.8 17.2
KR 1 1031 780 251 75.7 24.3
SE 1 518 402 116 77.6 22.4
TR 1 686 572 114 83.4 16.6
Table 5.1: HTTP reachability and content presence analysis: test statistics collected from PlanetLab
cc probes urls avgTriesPerURL TriesURLprobe avgreachperc avgunreachperc
US 69 298 194.38 2.8 76.81 23.19
CN 10 298 29.06 2.9 35.23 64.77
JP 6 296 17.64 2.9 75.11 24.89
NZ 6 298 17.3 2.9 60.49 39.51
UY 3 295 8.84 2.9 71.16 28.84
BR 2 295 8.83 4.4 80.97 19.03
CA 3 295 8.83 2.9 83.98 16.02
RU 3 296 8.82 2.9 70.3 29.7
XX 3 296 8.69 2.9 77.96 22.04
JO 2 298 6.0 3.0 0.0 100.0
GB 2 296 5.86 2.9 71.85 28.15
HK 2 295 3.93 2.0 85.25 14.75
00 1 298 3.4 3.4 19.3 80.7
BD 1 297 2.98 3.0 35.69 64.31
IN 1 295 2.95 3.0 85.31 14.69
KR 1 295 2.94 2.9 79.21 20.79
AU 1 295 2.94 2.9 79.83 20.17
AR 1 295 2.93 2.9 76.04 23.96
CZ 1 295 2.92 2.9 85.09 14.91
TR 1 294 1.96 2.0 85.54 14.46
EC 1 294 1.94 1.9 85.2 14.8
SE 1 298 1.74 1.7 81.94 18.06
Table 5.2: Presence of content: test statistics collected from PlanetLab
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Figure 5.2: HTTP reachability test (PlanetLab) - percentage of web content downloading test that return
HTTP code 200 OK and content size greater than zero (green) and percentage of tests not returning any
content.
5.1.2 Tor application censorship
One novel test we have implemented is the blocking of Tor application. It is an integrated
test in the sense that its outcome depends on the execution of several basic tests, towards
multiple targets. The definition of this test is mainly based on Winter [2013].
Collection: DNS resolution of
• Tor home page and mirrors
• Tor-based circumvention techniques and tools pages
• Tor overlay node list webpage
Collection: HTTP GET of
• Tor home page and mirrors
• Tor-based circumvention techniques and tools pages
• Tor overlay nodes list webpage
• Validated Tor overlay nodes list from Directory Authorities
Collection: TCP reachability of
• Tor nodes (relays)
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Node Consensus OK ping ok ping FAIL
pl2.6test.edu.cn 0 0 10
pl2.pku.edu.cn 0 0 10
pl2.zju.edu.cn 0 0 10
planet1.dsp.ac.cn 0 0 10
planet2.dsp.ac.cn 0 0 10
planetlab1.buaa.edu.cn 0 0 10
planetlab-1.sysu.edu.cn 0 0 10
planetlab2.cqupt.edu.cn 0 0 10
planetlab2.ustc.edu.cn 0 1 9
pln.zju.edu.cn 0 0 10
planetlab1.cqupt.edu.cn 0 0 10
pl1snu.koren.kr 1 0 9
csplanetlab4.kaist.ac.kr 9 1 0
planetlab1.eee.hku.hk 10 0 0
plab1.cs.ust.hk 9 1 0
pl02.comp.polyu.edu.hk 9 1 0
planetlab2.iitkgp.ac.in 10 0 0
planetlab1.iitkgp.ac.in 10 0 0
planetlab2.bgu.ac.il 10 0 0
planetlab-2.cmcl.cs.cmu.edu 9 1 0
planetlab6.csail.mit.edu 10 0 0
planet2.ku.edu.tr 9 1 0
Table 5.3: Tor censorship test: reachability of Directory Authorities.
• Tor Directory Authorities
The pseudocode describing the test is reported in Figure 5.3. The probe set we used
for this test is the PlanetLab one.
In Table 5.4 the results of Relay reachability are reported: for an updated list of 851
relays a TCP connection is attempted to the IP address and port that are advertised on
Directory Authorities. From the results it can be seen that probing hosts in China exhibit
a much higher percentage of blocked relays with respect to other countries. A notable
result can be seen for Korea, whose two available servers show opposite behavior: one (
pl1snu.koren.kr ) mostly sees blocked relays, while the other ( csplanetlab4.kaist.ac.kr )
has a ratio of blocked relays of 0.12 and thus analogous to non-censored case.
5.2 Censorship in Pakistan
In [ONI] country profiles Pakistan is classified as applying “selective filtering”, showing
consistent level of censorship and tight control on Internet communications across the
national border. The government body Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA)
is in charge of the management of the Pakistan Internet Exchange, the exchange point
connecting the country to the rest of the Internet, and maintains a blacklist of URLs
to be censored [Nabi, 2013]. According to the last report from [The OpenNet Initiative]
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Node TCP OK TCP FAIL fail ratio
pl2.6test.edu.cn 54 797 0.94
pl2.pku.edu.cn 47 804 0.94
pl2.zju.edu.cn 48 803 0.94
planet1.dsp.ac.cn 51 800 0.94
planet2.dsp.ac.cn 53 798 0.94
planetlab-1.sysu.edu.cn 50 801 0.94
planetlab2.cqupt.edu.cn 51 800 0.94
planetlab2.ustc.edu.cn 5 846 0.99
pln.zju.edu.cn 51 800 0.94
planetlab1.cqupt.edu.cn 48 803 0.94
pl1snu.koren.kr 47 804 0.94
csplanetlab4.kaist.ac.kr 752 99 0.12
planetlab1.eee.hku.hk 748 103 0.12
plab1.cs.ust.hk 746 105 0.12
pl02.comp.polyu.edu.hk 768 83 0.10
planetlab2.iitkgp.ac.in 748 103 0.12
planetlab1.iitkgp.ac.in 754 97 0.11
planetlab2.bgu.ac.il 749 102 0.12
planetlab-2.cmcl.cs.cmu.edu 769 82 0.10
planetlab6.csail.mit.edu 765 86 0.10
planet2.ku.edu.tr 747 104 0.12
Table 5.4: Tor censorship test: TCP reachability of Tor overlay nodes (relays).
Node HTTP reachable HTTP FAIL
pl2.6test.edu.cn 2 2
pl2.pku.edu.cn 2 2
pl2.zju.edu.cn 2 2
planet1.dsp.ac.cn 0 4
planet2.dsp.ac.cn 0 4
planetlab-1.sysu.edu.cn 2 2
planetlab2.cqupt.edu.cn 2 2
planetlab2.ustc.edu.cn 2 2
pln.zju.edu.cn 2 2
planetlab1.cqupt.edu.cn 2 2
pl1snu.koren.kr 1 3
Table 5.5: Tor censorship test: HTTP reachability of websites describing circumvention techniques and
tools. Only probes that had unreachable relays (see Table 5.4) perform this test.
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blocked resources belong to the classes: Religion, Sexuality and Politics.
5.2.1 Preliminary analysis
In the period between Sept 9th and 23th 2013, with the assistance of a local researcher
in Pakistan, we have conducted a measurement campaign from a BISMark router located
at the researcher’s house. Measurements were performed at intervals of 6 hours, more
precisely at 3AM, 9AM, 3PM, 9PM UTC, corresponding to 8AM, 2PM, 8PM, 2AM of
the local timezone (UTC+5). The choice of the sampling period and the time of the day
has been guided by possible diurnal patterns in network congestion. At roughly the same
time, another BISMark router located in the USA was performing the same measurement
on the same set of URLs.
DNS resolution analysis
On a total of 396 hostnames, 270 ( 68% ) are identically resolved from inside PK and
USA, thus excluding the occurrence of DNS-related censorship for the related resources.
For the remaining resources the analysis has exploited results from the content size tests.
Content size analysis
Considering the size of the resource (webpage) that has been retrieved, and averaging on
all measurements from within a country, we expect to find a significant difference between
different countries if one of the two is censoring the content by means of a “blocking page”
(see 2.3.7). For each URL u the average resource size per country su,PK =
∑
uinPK
size(u)
|PK|
is
calculated and divided by the corresponding size averaged on all the other countries (just
USA in this case); see Figure 5.4 for the SQLite implementation of the database query.
Indeed by considering the empirical CDF of such ratio (Figure 5.5) we can see that while
most of URLs show a comparable average size, there is an interesting fraction of URLs
whose size is much smaller in Pakistan with respect to US.
The empirical probability mass function distribution (Figure 5.6) shows clearly two
modes: one centered in 1 and a smaller one close to zero. While the variability around
1 can be considered as expected differences in parts of the HTML code that are updated
in the dynamic generation of the resource, the relatively big variations that lead to the
mode close to zero hint to a different phenomenon, on which we will focus to find evidence
of censorship.
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URL < sizePK > < sizeUS > Ratio
https://barenakedislam.wordpress.com 453.0 49095.63 0.01
http://www.internationalfreepresssociety.org 443.5 38085.32 0.01
http://ninjaproxy.com 342.45 14085.42 0.02
NinjaProxy.com 342.39 13154.06 0.03
http://www.similarsites.com 375.33 13701.44 0.03
http://www.youtube.com 4183.91 144177.2 0.03
http://www.freefacebookproxies.com/ 9041.17 241485.33 0.04
http://friendlyatheist.com 7881.34 205294.23 0.04
http://www.loonwatch.com 2661.73 65075.19 0.04
http://www.sodahead.com 3575.67 73969.7 0.05
http://www.hotspotshield.com/ 731.8 10789.91 0.07
http://face-of-muhammed.blogspot.com/ 6208.7 85342.93 0.07
http://www.foxnews.com 4705.53 63425.26 0.07
http://www.buzzfeed.com 22097.93 287001.77 0.08
www.freefacebookproxies.com/ 18245.93 233254.73 0.08
www.hotspotshield.com 870.1 10632.97 0.08
http://www.cagle.com/news/muhammad/ 3594.5 40974.12 0.09
www.smugbox.com/facebook/login/stories?id=226 1883.93 21455.95 0.09
http://www.faithfreedom.org/Gallery/28.htm 1438.93 15423.32 0.09
http://www.turbohide.com/ 896.91 8744.12 0.1
http://www.internationalfreepresssociety.org/ 16541.03 156461.16 0.11
www.unblockbook.net 812.48 6348.47 0.13
http://www.thesecretninjaproxy.info/ 469.79 3416.17 0.14
www.kproxy.com. 647.47 4694.55 0.14
www.kproxy.com 666.39 4618.71 0.14
http://www.unblock-facebook.net 840.26 5783.3 0.15
www.blockedsiteaccess.com 1271.46 7780.19 0.16
www.proxyserver.it 395.26 1055.39 0.37
http://www.proxyblog.cn/ 5308.0 13474.44 0.39
Table 5.6: Selection of URLs whose content size ratio (size collected from PK divided size collected from
US) is lower than the threshold (0.5); size is averaged for a given country, and measured in Bytes ; URL
path may be truncated for presentation constraints.
In order to differentiate between the two modes we choose a threshold of 0.5, falling
amid the two. An excerpt of the URLs whose size ratio falls below this threshold (in total
56, of which 28 are youtube videos) are reported in table 5.6.
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Figure 5.5: Empirical CDF of content size ratios (PK versus US) for each URL
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Figure 5.6: Empirical PDF content size ratios (PK versus US) for each URL, tested URLs are from Nabi
[2013] (468 URLs)
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Figure 5.7: Empirical CDF of content size ratios (IT versus US) for each URL
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Figure 5.8: Empirical PDF content size ratios (PK versus US) for each URL, tested URLs the same
checked in Pakistan
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Taking one of the URLs selected through the average content size ratio test, namely
ninjaproxy.com (accounting for 343Bytes in Pakistan and 14753Bytes from USA), by
looking at the HTML code received by the client in Pakistan(Figure 5.9) it is possible to
confirm that it is completely different from the one retrieved from outside Pakistan (Fig-
ure 5.10. Indeed censorship has been enacted providing a webpage with iframe redirection
to a blocking page. These results are consistent with Nabi [2013] and the analysis in the
report by [The Citizen Lab] on this country.
1 <iframe
2 src="http://202.125.134.154/webadmin/deny/?
3 dpid=1
4 &dpruleid=78
5 &cat=104
6 &ttl=0
7 &groupname=PTCL2
8 &policyname=PTCL2−policy
9 &username=MMBB−22
10 &userip=XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX
11 &connectionip=127.0.0.1
12 &nsphostname=KHI494−NSP−04
13 &protocol=policyprocessor
14 &dplanguage=−
15 &url=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2eninjacloak%2ecom%2f"
16 width="100%" height="100%" frameborder=0>
17 </iframe>
Figure 5.9: HTML code of censored webpage (ninjaproxy.com) in PK; newlines have been added for
clarity, the code consists of a single line; at line 10 the retrieved HTML shows the actual IP address of
the probe, that has been hidden in this display with ”XXX”.
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1 <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "−//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01
2 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.
3 dtd">
4
5 <html>
6 <head>
7
8 <!−− stop obfuscation −−>
9 <SCRIPT TYPE="text/javascript" SRC="http://ad.
10 xtendmedia.
11 com/st?ad type=pop&ad size=0x0&section=1525666&banned po
12 p types=28&pop times=3&pop frequency=3600&pub url=${
13 PUB URL}"></SCRIPT>
14
15 <script type=’text/javascript’>
16 var adParams = {a: ’11841072’, rt:’generic’,
17 serverdomain: ’s.m2pub.com’, closeButton: ’Left’,
18 backgroundColor: ’transparent’, size: ’728x90’ ,
19 context:’c12310043’ };
20 </script>
21 <script type=’text/javascript’ src=’http://creative.
22 m2pub.com/matomy/scripts/catfish/catfish.js’></script>
23 <script type=’text/javascript’>
24 var myArray=new Array();
25 myArray[0] = ’%0n%0n%0n%0n%09<fpevcg
26 ynathntr=%22WninFpevcg%22>%0n%09gel %7o%0n%09
27 ine k = gbc.ybpngvba.ubfg;%0n%09%7q pngpu %28r%29
28 %7o%0n%09 gbc.ybpngvba.ercynpr%28%22uggc://%22+
29 ybpngvba.ubfg%29;%0n%09%7q%0n%09</fpevcg>%0n%0n%09<
30 yvax ery=%22fubegphg vpba%22 uers=%22snivpba.vpb%22>
31 %0n <gvgyr>Avawn Pybnx %7p Snfg, serr, nabalzbhf
32 jro oebjfvat jvgu AvawnPybnx.pbz</gvgyr>%0n <
33 fglyr glcr=%22grkg/pff%22>%0n <!−−%0n obql
34 %7o%0n onpxtebhaq−pbybe: #000000;%0n
35 pbybe: #ssssss;%0n sbag−snzvyl: ireqnan,
36 gnubzn, nevny, fnaf−frevs;%0n sbag−fvmr:
37 13ck;%0n %7q%0n n, n:npgvir, n:ivfvgrq%0n
38 %7o%0n pbybe: #ssO400;%0n %7q%0n .
39 heyva %7o%0n sbag−fvmr: 13ck;%0n sbag−
40 snzvyl: ireqnan, gnubzn, nevny;%0n cnqqvat:
41 3ck 3ck 4ck 5ck;%0n obeqre: fbyvq 1ck
42 #000000;%0n %7q%0n .heytb %7o%0n sbag−
43 jrvtug: obyq;%0n sbag−snzvyl: ireqnan,
44 gnubzn, nevny;%0n %7q%0n .fz %7o sbag−fvmr:
45 11ck; %7q%0n .kfz %7o sbag−fvmr: ’;
Figure 5.10: HTML code of the original webpage (ninjaproxy.com) from US (fist 15 lines)
5.2.2 Censorship in Pakistan
Hereafter we report results from the automated analysis of data collected for 540 URLs
over 5 different Pakistani ISPs. A selection of notable results is described.
The case of Youtube
An example of blocked URL showing interesting differences among ISPs is the streaming
video platform - with content and comment sharing from users - Youtube (www.youtube.
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com, integrated with the social network google plus and the search engine google).
An overall results report for the URL of a resource on the Youtube portal as tested
from different ISPs in Pakistan is shown in form of a bar chart in Figure 5.11.
Figure 5.11: Censorship in Pakistan: Youtube - different censorship techniques
It is evident, from the lack of bars in the second aggregate (with label “Content
plausible”) that this resource is never reachable, even though for all but one ISP a resource
is returned when performing an HTTP request (first aggregate of bars, labeled “Content
available”).
We recall that “Content plausible” is the percentage of URLs that passed the size
ratio censorship test, and thus present a content size comparable to the average on all
countries. The outcome of this test is represented in Figure 5.12 as a CDF of the ratio
of the size of the downloaded content in one sample over the global average of such size.
The CDF for Pakistan is shown (in dark blue) along with other countries for comparison:
Italy (cyan) and U.S.A. (in green); the aggregation level is country, thus considering
samples for the whole nations regardless of the ISP. The graph shows clearly that the
size ratios in Pakistan are close to 0 (i.e. the content size is very small compared with
the global average) with relative frequency 1 (always), while for both the other countries
the occurrences fall close to 1 (thus same content size as the global average) with relative
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frequency greater than 0.9 (for U.S.A. 0.91 for a size 1.23 times the average, for Italy 0.95
for a size 1.11 times the average). Comparing with the size ratio threshold (set to 0.3
in the prototype test) we notice that the test has correctly separated results in Pakistan
from the ones in the other countries. Moreover as the detected condition is above the
coherence threshold the reported results are consistent over each country dataset.
Figure 5.12: Censorship in Pakistan: Youtube - Empirical CDF of content size ratio; the abscissa is the
ratio of a content size sample over the global average; the vertical threshold separates samples that fail
the test (smaller than the threshold) from the ones that pass (greater); results are considered in the final
verdict only if the coherence threshold (horizontal red line) is reached.
TCP-level tests (third aggregate, label “TCP reachable”) show almost 100% reacha-
bility for all the ISP, thus either no censorship is enacted at this layer, or DNS tampering
precedes it.
By considering the default DNS results for two ISPs “Micronet Broadband (Pvt) Ltd.”
and “Witribe Pakistan Ltd.” no result yields a plausible IP address (i.e. neither a known
block page or a failing IP, nor a DNS error), similarly for “Pakistan Telecom Company
Ltd.” only 11.7% is plausible. These ISPs clearly block the resource with DNS tampering.
The DNS overall results show equal values for the default and the control resolvers,
thus the inferred technique is DNS injection. The ISPs “Transworld Associates” (red in
Figure 5.13) and “National Wi-Max/IMS” (dark blue) do not perform DNS tampering
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on the resource under analysis; yet for both the content size ratio analysis has detected
censorship: an HTTP tampering technique has been applied.
To gather information regarding the symptom the user gets in the censored networks,
we leverage the detailed DNS analysis, shown in Figure 5.13. It can be noted that, while
two ISPs (namely, “Micronet Broadband (Pvt) Ltd.” and “Witribe Pakistan Ltd.”) both
use DNS tampering to provide the user with an explicit block page, the ISP “Pakistan
Telecom Company Ltd.” returns an address that will likely cause an error (either at
TCP-level or an HTTP-404), thus confounding the customer without providing explicit
notification of censorship.
From the comparison between the summarized view (Figure 5.11) and the DNS anal-
ysis details (Figure 5.13) the behavior of one ISP (“Pakistan Telecom Company Ltd.”,
in red) seems inconsistent with the expected symptom, as the detected technique (“DNS
injection - failing IP”) should have elicited an error, and not the high percentages found
both in TCP reachable and Content available bars (5.11). By inspecting the collected
evidence data it resulted that the IP address returned by the ISP under analysis is
127.0.0.1, corresponding to localhost, i.e. for each machine is the address of the
machine itself (network level loopback); while other “specialized” network address ranges
[Cotton and Vegoda, 2010] are unlikely to be assigned to active hosts in the same LAN
of the probe, localhost for sure is, and the outcome of a TCP connection to the port 80
and possibly an HTTP request depend on the presence of a service listening on that port,
and the response the service will return, if present. The inspection confirms the verdict of
the platform, that detected censorship and the actual technique DNS injection regardless
of the misleading symptoms (no errors at any level of the stack - DNS, TCP, HTTP).
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Figure 5.13: Censorship in Pakistan: Youtube - detail of DNS analysis.
5.3 Censorship in Italy
The measurement campaign performed for the validation of the platform have confirmed
that Internet censorship in Italy is enforced mainly against websites proposing online
gaming and betting and copyright infringement; another significant motivation for cen-
sorship is the block of child pornography, but due to ethical issues in potentially involving
volunteers in police investigations the latter has been not tested.
From collected data it is evident that no centralized censoring infrastructure is present,
as censoring is detected for different ISPs starting and ending at different times, and
censoring techniques are sometimes different (in the vast majority DNS hijacking, and
case-specific TCP blocking).
The Italian Agency for State Monopolies (AAMS) 1 provides an official list of domains2
that have been blocked because of infringement of the Italian laws on online gaming and
betting (that require a state license).
Another -but non-official - source is provided by an independent researcher in his
1Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato, eee.aams.gov.it
2http://www.aams.gov.it/sites/aams2008/files/documenti old/private/downloads/documentazione/
scommesse/Elenco siti inibiti/elenco siti inibiti.rtf
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“observatory on censorship” website3 where a list of censored domains together with the
authority that issued the censoring order and the date it was issued are reported.
The measurement campaign has been performed on 5 ISPs testing more than 840
target URLs, of which only 59 resulted not accessible or with a content differing from the
one retrieved outside of Italy. In the case of blocks of websites proposing online gaming
and betting the block is explicit (by means of a blockpage), while for websites related to
file sharing the block is not motivated, resulting in a network error or a website describing
a generic error.
The censoring technique used most across all the tested ISPs is DNS hijacking whose
effect is graphically shown in Figure 5.14, in which DNS resolution requested to the probe
default resolver is compared between probes from inside Italy (red lines) and USA (blue
lines).
A few specific examples are described in the following.
5.3.1 Betting and gaming
The website bet365.com will be used as a representative of the betting and gaming website
class.
Figure 5.15: Censorship in Italy: gaming websites - censorship techniques
3http://censura.bofh.it/elenchi.html
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The results of censorship analysis algorithms for the resource bet365.com is reported
in Figure 5.15. We can see that for the ISP “NGI” the percentage of DNS resolutions
performed the probe’s default resolver is as little as 4.5%. This is reflected by an analogous
percentage of content of plausible size. From the same graph it can be seen that also
for “Wind Telecomunicazioni” and “Telecom Italia” providers there are low percentage
of plausible DNS resolution (31.2% and 46.1% respectively) and similar percentages of
plausible content size (23.8% and 46.1% respectively). Only for the “Center for REsearch
And Telecommunication Experimentation” ISP, that is user of the GARR 4, ISP both
the DNS resolutions and the downloaded content size are always plausible, showing no
censorship on its network for the considered resource. For the others, by comparing the
result between the default DNS resolver and the control ones it can be inferred that the
technique is of type DNS hijacking, as no control DNS is affected.
We can dig into deeper detail by inspecting the results of the DNS analysis, reported
as a bar chart in Figure 5.16. Here we can see that for all the three ISPs censoring the
resulting DNS response belongs to the list of known blockpages, thus the adopted censoring
technique has the effect of presenting the user with a block webpage explicitly telling her
of the censorship.
4The “GARR” is the Italian Academic and Research telecommunication network, a non-profit organi-
zation founded to manage an high speed infrastructure to connect to the Internet for the Italian academic,
research and education communities. Website: http://www.garr.it
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Figure 5.16: Censorship in Italy: gaming websites - detail of DNS analysis for bet365.com
From the Figure 5.16 it can also be noted that with the exception of “NGI Spa”, with
95.4%, no ISP gives percentages close to the totality. The possible causes of this behavior
can be: (i) a variability of the censor behavior in the analysis time interval (beginning or
ending of censorship) (ii) heterogeneity of the probe environment at a granularity smaller
than the ISP level.
The temporal evolution of the case under description is drawn in Figure 5.17: it can
be seen that the oscillating results between reachability (upper line) and unreachability is
limited to the default resolvers (the first two entries in the key, prepended with “DEF:”),
while the control resolvers always report the domain as uncensored. It can be noted that
the default DNS server address - as reported in the DNS reply - in the case under analysis
corresponds to localhost: a local caching application such as dnsmasq5 is in function on
the probe system, preventing the collection of the local default resolver.
5 dnsmasq is an open source DNS cache and forwarder, installed by default on several distribution
of Linux, including OpenWRT and Ubuntu, main OSes for the UBICA probes. Website: http://www.
thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/doc.html
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Figure 5.17: Censorship in Italy: gaming websites - DNS temporal analysis
5.3.2 Streaming and File Sharing
The second class of website censored in Italy is constituted by repositories and index
directories for file sharing and multimedia streaming. As an example of this class we con-
sider the index directory thepiratebay.sx. In Figure 5.18 the overall behavior in terms of
adopted censorship techniques of different Italian ISPs can be seen. Besides the low per-
centages of plausible DNS responses for the default resolver, in this case low percentages
are present also for control DNS servers. Moreover, differently from the case of betting
websites, also the ISP connected through the Academic and Research network GARR
presents low percentages (less than 50% for both default and control resolvers, and close
to 40% of content availability). Other notable difference is in the result for TCP reachabil-
ity: while in for the online betting website this measure scored close to 100% reachability
for 3 out of 4 ISP (and more than 75% for the remaining one), in the case of the file
sharing website 2 ISPs show less than 50% reachability at the TCP level.
A more in-depth inspection of the results of DNS measures, reported in Figure 5.19,
shows a much more diverse scenario with respect to the case of betting websites (Fig-
ure 5.16).
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Figure 5.18: Censorship in Italy: file sharing websites - results of different techniques for thepiratebay.sx
All the ISPs show different DNS errors, both for default and control DNS servers.
One ISP (“Wind Telecomunicazioni”) for the default resolver shows a 65.5% responses
returning a failing IP, namely 127.0.0.1, and 7.7% of NXDOMAIN or TIMEOUT DNS errors.
Different percentages of errors are shown by the other ISPs, each characterized by the
presence of multiple symptoms of DNS unreachability in strong discordance with the case
of betting websites (each ISP concentrated in one kind of DNS unreachability symptom).
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Figure 5.19: Censorship in Italy: file sharing websites - detail of DNS analysis for thepiratebay.sx
The temporal analysis of the DNS measures, represented in the time series of Fig-
ure 5.20, helps explaining such combination of results for the “Wind” ISP. In fact sim-
ilarly to the case of betting websites (Figure 5.17) there is for the default resolvers an
oscillation between reachability and unreachability spun over the first half of the time-
line, again explainable with the lack of control over the default DNS set for the probe; in
this case, however, all the resolvers no matter if default or control, report unreachability.
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Figure 5.20: Censorship in Italy: file sharing websites - DNS temporal analysis for thepiratebay.sx and
the “Wind” ISP.
The unreachability of thepiratebay.sx starting from December 10th 2013 is verified by
the probes in all the countries, signaling a server-side event has occurred. From manual
check of external information (the news section of the same website, freshly moved to
another Top Level Domain: http://thepiratebay.se/blog/234) we can validate the finding
of the UBICA platform: the old hostname has been dismissed on December 10th.
5.4 Censorship in Korea
The access to online content in South Korea is regulated by a government body, Ko-
rea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC) nominated by the president and in
charge of the Ethics of Internet communications. The nation is reported by [ONI] as
applying “selective filtering” for Social topics and “pervasive filtering” for the Conflic-
t/Security category.
In this measurement campaign 384 targets have been tested, of which 26 have resulted
in a censorship detection.
One single UBICA probe (of type standalone script) has been available for the testing,
thus the results are not to be considered representative for the country, but again as an
example of usage and a validation of the platform functionality.
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Adult websites
A category of websites that is forbidden per order of the Ethical authority is the one show-
ing adult content (classified among “obscenity and perversion”). The detection algorithm
has signaled censorship for URLs such as hardsextube.com, pornhub.com and redtube.
com, coherently with the expectations. We will consider the case of hardsextube.com in
detail, as the other present analogous results.
By considering the summarized view for the different tested techniques, aggregated by
country (Figure 5.21), it becomes evident the peculiar response in Korea with respect to
the other tested countries. More specifically, the “content plausible” percentage of tests,
result of the analysis based on the size ratio of the downloaded resource, is near 0% while
other countries show near 100%, thus limiting to Korea only the issue in accessing the
original content. Also no other censorship detection technique has been matched, thus
excluding DNS Tampering and TCP-level filtering.
Figure 5.21: Censorship in Korea: porn websites - comparison with other countries, for different tech-
niques.
To inspect in more detail the test that has detected censorship we refer to Figure 5.22,
where the Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function is drawn of the ratio of each sample
content size over the global average.
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Figure 5.22: Censorship in Korea: porn - Empirical CDF of the content size ratio
It can be seen that only results for Korea (in green, close to the ordinates axis) are
almost completely (0.98%) below the detection threshold (empirically set to 0.3), while
all other countries have the almost totality of samples beyond 1.1, with the exception
for U.K., U.S.A. and Brazil with small fraction (less than 0.16) falling just short of the
threshold.
Even though these results would not have raised a censorship verdict due to the small
relative percentage (pre-filtering data cleansing ignores cases that represent less than 70%
of the results, see Section 4.4.1) we have manually checked the content and found that
corresponds to mobile versions of the requested website. The detection algorithm based
on the size ratio has proven robust to content adaptation [Md Fudzee and Abawajy, 2008]
in this scenario but further research should be pursued in order to generalize this result.
In order to validate the censorship verdict, we have manually inspected the returned
resource, whose content is shown in Figure 5.23. It can be seen that the returned webpage,
result of the HTTP tampering technique (see Section 2.3.6), consists of a single JavaScript
section whose effect when interpreted by the browser is to redirect (line 15, method
location.replace) to the address specified at line 2: http://warning.or.kr, the official
block page of the Korean authority for Internet censorship.
Discussion 126
1 <html><script>
2 var arg = "http://warning.or.kr";
3 var str = new Array();
4 str = arg.split("&", 1);
5 var a = new Array();
6 a = str[0].split("=");
7 var b = Math.floor(a[1] / 100);
8 var c = new Array();
9 if(b == 10){location.replace("http://www.naver.com");}
10 else if(b == 20){location.replace("http://www.daum.net")
11 ;}
12 else if(b == 30){location.replace("http://www.paran.
13 com");}
14 else{ c = a[0].split("?");
15 location.replace(c[0]);}
16 </script></html>
Figure 5.23: HTML code of censored webpage (hardsextube.com) in South Korea: it consists completely
of a JavaScript code redirecting invariably to the official Korean block page whose address is in line 2.
5.5 Discussion
The realized prototype has proved not just functional in field tests, but actually helpful
in investigating the phenomenon of censorship in its dynamism and effective in providing
results about the actual enforcement of Internet censorship in several countries worldwide.
Thanks to the experimental evaluation, from the field test some shortcomings and
limitations have surfaced that will be discussed hereafter.
5.5.1 Accounting for legitimate HTML-based redirection
In describing the collection of clues related with HTTP reachability (Section 4.3.2) we
have highlighted that the sequence of HTTP requests does follow HTTP redirects (HTTP
response code 30X), while it does not process the returned content, thus stopping in case of
HTML-based redirections. In case of censorship enforced by returning such a redirection
in place of the requested content, the clue is the redirection code itself, that proves the
censorship and its intentionality.
There are several legitimate cases of usage of HTML-based redirection, such as website
migration, auto-refreshing dynamic data, splash screens, URL shortening services and
varying degrees of customization of the content [Chellapilla and Maykov, 2007]. If the
requested resource does legitimate use of HTML-based redirection then the actual target
to be tested would be the resource to which the user would be redirected. In this case an
user adopting a (JavaScript enabled-) browser would automatically try and get the linked
resource, and censorship could be triggered or enforced on the latter. In the proposed
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design this scenario is modeled in terms of target collection phase: the retrieved HTML can
be parsed in search of HTML redirections, that are added as new targets, leveraging the
closed-loop control paradigm that exploits measurement results to inform the scheduling
of subsequent measurements.
Strictly speaking, the monitoring platform is right in reporting that the original target
resource is not censored. This procedure, though technically coherent, differs from what
an user would experience if censorship is triggered or enforced on the landing page, and
by checking the censorship report she could find the results counter-intuitive at best.
As one of the design goals of the platform is to provide an informative report to
the citizen, this aspect has to be addressed in future work on the platform. A possible
solution is, having implemented the HTML parsing in the target collection phase, to
save the relationship between the original target resource and this secondary HTML-
based-redirected resource and exploit this relationship to provide the user with results of
censorship analysis that matches with her intuitive point of view.
5.5.2 Performance and scalability
The implemented prototype concentrated in a single server the roles of Management,
Repository, Database, Analysis Engine and Reporting Servers. In case the load on the
system were to become significant for the underlying hardware the different components
of the platform could be instantiated on different machines networked - possibly on a LAN
- in order to distribute the load (at the expense of transmission latency and bandwidth
consumption).
This solution is not of much help if the Data Base Management System (DBMS) is
the bottleneck, that could be the case when the parsing and insertion of report archives,
the censorship analysis detection algorithms, and the queries for visual reporting of the
results can happen concurrently.
Preliminary investigation has suggested that the parsing process has a significant im-
pact on the computing resources: a possible solution could be the split of parsing processes
over multiple distributed servers. A solution to be investigated is to split the parsing
process onto multiple distributed servers. Possible drawbacks could then derive in the
management of a distributed database, with related synchronization issues, and the exe-
cution of analysis algorithms on such distributed data sets. An approach better suited for
this distributed scenario is provided by the “No-SQL” DBMS paradigm [Grolinger et al.,
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2013]; the analysis of the opportunity to move from a Relational model to this paradigm
(or possibly the adoption of the “New-SQL” tools without changing the model) has been
demanded to future work.
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-- q_cc_stats_sqlite.sql
-- reachable means HTTP 200 and content size >0
-- probes are counted as different IPs
-- (todo: derive AS and ISP)
select
r.cc as probeCC,
p.probes ,
r.count+u.count as tot_tests,
r.count as test_reach,
u.count as test_unreach,
round ( 100 * ( cast(r.count as real) / (r.count+u.count)) ,1) as reachperc,
round ( 100 * ( cast(u.count as real) / (r.count+u.count)) ,1) as unreachperc
from (
select
cc,
count(*) as count
from experiment
where
termination = ’normal’
and contentsize is not null
and httpcode = ’200’
group by cc
) as r
left join (
select
cc,
count(*) as count
from experiment
where
termination = ’normal’
and contentsize is null
group by cc
) as u on r.cc=u.cc
left join (
select
cc,
count(distinct clientip) as probes
from experiment
where termination = ’normal’
group by cc
) as p on r.cc=p.cc
order by probes desc
;
Figure 5.1: Presence of content analysis test: SQL code - basic analysis of HTTP reachability collection
test.
IF ( DNS response for webpages ) <> ( ground truth )
OR
( content of all webpages is unreachable )
OR
( X% of Directory Authorities is not TCP-reachable )
OR
( Y% of relays is not TCP-reachable )
THEN Tor is censored
Figure 5.3: Pseudocode of the censorship test revealing the blocking of the Tor application. X and Y are
threshold parameters to be defined empirically.
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-- q_url_contentsize_PKvsUS.sql
-- given one CountryCode (opt: and a threshold ratio),
-- lists URLs whose average content size
-- divided by average of all other countries
-- is smaller than the threshold
SELECT
pkavg.url AS URL
, round(pkavg.avgsize,2) AS avgPK
, round(outpkavg.avgsize,2) AS avgnotPK
, round(pkavg.avgsize / outpkavg.avgsize,2) AS "PK vs all ratio"
FROM (
SELECT
url
, avg(contentsize) AS avgsize
FROM experiment
WHERE
cc="PK"
AND contentsize > 0
GROUP BY url
) AS pkavg
LEFT JOIN (
SELECT
url
, avg(contentsize) AS avgsize
FROM experiment
WHERE
cc<>"PK"
AND contentsize > 0
GROUP BY url
) AS outpkavg
ON pkavg.url=outpkavg.url
ORDER BY ( pkavg.avgsize / outpkavg.avgsize ) ASC
;
Figure 5.4: SQL code used to find possible censorship evidence according to average size ratio
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Figure 5.14: DNS hijacking in Italy: DNS resolution graph for betting websites. Ellipses contain host names, rectangles contain IP addresses,
red lines are resolutions from inside Italy, using default (ISP) resolver, while blue lines are resolutions requested by a probe in USA to its default
resolver.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
The awareness of the political importance of Internet as a mass medium has raised with
examples such as the political campaign on Online Social Networks of the president B.
Obama; the supposed role of blogging platforms during the “Arab Spring” of 2011, and -all
differences considered- in Italy, with the recent trend of political communication through
microblogging platforms. Governments worldwide, having acknowledged the Internet as
an important channel for information, public discussion and organization of communities
of interest, have exerted their control power on it. This has led to an arms race for the
adoption of surveillance and censorship tools on a side, and privacy preserving and censor-
ship circumvention tools on the other. As a consequence, different censorship techniques
have been adopted over time in different countries worldwide. The actual extension of this
phenomenon is not advertised by the censors, that thus become hardly accountable for
it; hence the necessity of an independent and provable assessment of Internet censorship
by its detection and continuous monitoring. These motivations have lead the research
conducted by the candidate, described hereafter.
The available literature on Internet censorship has been found based mainly in net-
work security (more focused on circumvention), while the techniques employed to enforce
censorship derive also from traffic classification and traffic engineering. A selection of
findings and studies have been analyzed adopting a network monitoring point of view, in
order to extract the elements instrumental to the detection of network-based censorship.
Using web applications as a reference for client-server network applications on the
Internet, a simplified model of the communication has been defined comprising the pro-
tocols involved (at the network, transport and application layers of the TCP/IP stack),
the network topology, and the intermediate devices found on the path between client and
133
server. Using the defined model, the censorship techniques have been characterized ac-
cording to different elements, namely: the location of the surveillance device, the trigger,
i.e. the element of the communication that elicits the activation of the censoring action;
the localization of the censoring device, i.e. the component of the censoring system that
applies the censoring action and the censoring action itself, i.e. the blocking or impairing
of the access to the resource or service, or the mangling of the content of the communica-
tion. This has constituted an original contribution of the candidate, aimed at providing
an unifying and comprehensive model of a complex phenomenon so far investigated in
heterogeneous study fields.
With the same approach of analysis and with reference to the same model, the tech-
niques and tools available for the detection of Internet censorship have been characterized,
based on their ability to purposely generate or just receive traffic to elicit censorship, the
types of triggers that said traffic can contain, the criteria to infer censorship and to ig-
nore involuntary outages. The availability has been researched of censorship monitoring
platforms, aimed at providing a quasi-real-time running report of the state of applica-
tion of Internet censorship on a global scale and for year-long time scales. The properties
such a platform should provide have also been analyzed and described, on the basis of the
different approaches found in literature and in field usage.
From such analysis of the state of the art and definition of requirements, it has surfaced
the lack of a full-fledged censorship monitoring platform performing a complete monitoring
cycle, comprising the collection of the potential targets, the scheduling of the measurement
experiments, the collection and analysis of the measurement results, and the publishing of
the results of the analysis. In fact the only available platform that more closely matches
the requirements, namely the [Herdict] project, has design properties that strongly limit
the collection of evidences on which analysis should be based. Being based on user-
submitted reports of reachability of web pages either chosen by the user or suggested
by the platform, it is subject to limits such as: (i) report data prone to human error
and possibly arbitrary judgment; (ii) choice of targets to be tested depends on users; (iii)
frequency of testing depends on users active participation; (iv) availability of only one kind
of basic reachability test; (v) little or no possibility to infer the censorship technique (vi)
only raw and aggregated data are reported, with no described preprocessing (necessary
to discard human errors and outages).
Two other proposals from the literature have provided a consistent coverage of the
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defined requirements for a censorship monitoring platform, but either are not publicly
available [Sfakianakis et al., 2011] or are still partially developed and not ready for use
[OONI], and both lack analysis and publishing functionalities.
In order to fill this gap and provide the research community with a platform to in-
vestigate the phenomenon of Internet Censorship for years-long periods on a global scale,
and the citizen with an informative report on their own capabilities to access the Internet,
the UBICA (User Based Internet Censorship Analysis) platform has been designed.
The platform is based on architectures for network performance measurement and
monitoring [de Donato et al., 2014] and is composed by a management server, a limited
number of helper servers and a heterogeneous set of clients.
The client has been designed to be highly portable, composed of a core measurement-
related part (written in the Ash shell scripting language) and leverages standard UNIX
utilities and mature network diagnostic tools. Wrapping the core measurement part there
are different platform-specific implementations, including a GUI for desktop versions and
a minimal command-line interface for headless versions. This design allows to execute the
core in almost identical form on the different hardware and software platforms, including
embedded home gateway routers [Sundaresan et al., 2012], a platform for distributed
experiments system - PlanetLab [Chun et al., 2003] - and personal computers (both recent
Windows and Linux-based operating systems).
The probes periodically ask the management server for experiments, if scheduled then
update the measurement script, download the list of targets, perform the measurements
and return the results to the server.
The management server performs a cyclic sequence of activities, including the collec-
tion of lists of possible censorship targets from external sources and by direct submission
from users; the orchestration of the measurement activities performed by clients; the
analysis of measurement data to (a) create the censorship reports and (b) update the
scheduling of measurements.
The monitoring platform presents three different interfaces: a management interface
for operators, a global censorship report view (public) and an user-centric view (for the
volunteers hosting the probes). The management interface provides the most complete
access to both the database and the experiment definition and scheduling; the public
global view offers an aggregated view of the results of censorship analysis, at global and
country level; the user-centric view provides the volunteers a quick report on the status of
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the censorship from their network viewpoint, offering an incentive for running the UBICA
client.
A set of measurement tests have been defined and implemented to collect evidence of
censorship, comprising DNS querying, TCP reachability, HTTP reachability, TLS reacha-
bility and verification, HTTP content size evaluation. These tests are based on censorship
tests defined in literature, implemented leveraging the capabilities of the platform.
An algorithm for the detection of censorship and inference of the classes of censor-
ship techniques from measurement data has been defined and applied to the results of a
preliminary measurement campaign.
This algorithm constitutes an original contribution, together with the design of the
platform, of the measurement tests and the reporting interfaces, and the characterization
of the Internet censorship techniques based on the review of the literature.
A measurement campaign has been performed on a global scale with the help of volun-
teers running the probes and concurrently with the usage of the PlanetLab and BISMark
[Sundaresan et al., 2012] measurement platforms. The preliminary results, validated by
means of external sources of information, have verified the effectiveness of the platform
and of the proposed censorship detection and analysis algorithm.
While the platform prototype has proved effective and useful in collecting evidence of
censorship from a diverse set of countries and networks, it has shown possible limitations in
the elaboration performance: a preliminary check suggests that the parsing and insertion
in the database of the measurement results, running concurrently with censorship analysis
algorithms, may suffer scalability problems. A solution to be investigated is to split the
parsing process onto multiple distributed servers. Possible drawbacks could then derive in
the management of a distributed database and the execution of the censorship detection
algorithm on it. Such investigation has been left for future research.
The implemented measurement tests do not yet leverage the potential of the platform
for an automatic tuning of testing frequencies: further research could investigate a robust
scheduling algorithm optimizing the generated probe traffic and the frequency of tests.
Once UBICA had reached significant public visibility, a reaction could come from gov-
ernments that would prefer not have their censorship activities exposed: possible threats
for the platform functionality could go from blocking communications with the central-
ized management server (censoring UBICA) to whitelisting the UBICA clients, so that
no censorship is detected. While the circumvention has been explicitly taken apart from
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the requirements for the platform, future research on this could investigate a distributed
implementation of UBICA less prone to blocking. In case of whitelisting, it could be ex-
ploited the fact that users hosting an UBICA client would then get a more open access
to the Internet.
Both data and the access to the platform will be provided to the scientific community
for further analysis, fostering more extensive and diverse research from third parties, and
to the public, to help keeping a watchful eye on the Internet Censorship.
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